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LETTER FROM THE DEPARTMENT CHAIR 
In this, Res Publica's nineteenth issue, we encounter a fine collection of some of the best 
work produced by our students this year. Sponsored by the IWU chapter of Pi Sigma Alpha, 
the national political science honor society, this Res Publica showcases the incisive thinking 
and very capable writing of students who each, in her or his own way, address various 
intersections between attitude fonnation - or in some cases big ideas - and political practice. 
Topics include the potential tension between the ideas of modem democracy and the ancient 
ideas of Confucianism, the political salience of second-hand smoke, the impact of economic 
conditions on violence in Northern Ireland, the dance between right-wing populist parties 
and European voters, the efficacy of family value frames as ideological metaphors, and U.S. 
Supreme Court justices' annual parry with one another and public opinion as they selectively 
assert their institution's role as the dark horse in American politics. These are thoughtful, 
challenging, and indeed delightful essays to read. This year's issue of Res PllbJica truly 
deserves a broad audience, so we hope once you have read it you will share it with friends, 
family members, and colleagues. We are quite proud of our students' accomplishments are 
thrilled to share some of those with you here. 
Each year the curriculum in the Department of Political Science greets new members of our 
community with a series of introductory courses as they acclimate to college life. From there 
students branch out to explore a wide variety of areas running along the major dimensions 
of our discipline, from institutions and behavior, to American and international topics, 
employing qualitative and quantitative tools. By their senior years, many of our students have 
sampled broadly from this rich array of topics and experiences. As they undertake their 
senior research seminars - the source of most of these essays - they apply what they have 
learned. At their best, they produce the work you hold in your hands. The maturation of 
their analytical skills is truly remarkable over four years, and we are excited about the 
students' prospects as professionals and, importantly, as citizens. There is, of course, a 
bittersweet quality to the impending graduation of most of these authors, though as we see 
them go we dwell on the sweet, knowing they will talce with them into a complicated, inter­
connected, competitive, and (as Patrick Cavanaugh reminds us) dangerous world the 
knowledge, values, and skills they learned during their time at Illinois Wesleyan. The faculty 
members are grateful for their coming, and their going. 
A particular thanks goes to Res Ptlblica's lead editors, Nick Desideri and Ryan Winter, ably 
assisted by associate editors Lauren Burke and Patrick Cavanaugh. From start to finish Res 
Publica is a student production. We are proud of them for what they have done here, , 
producing and sustaining what we believe to be one of the few undergraduate political 
science journals in the nation for nineteen years running. We also look forward to hearing 
about their outrageously successful careers and lives in the years to come. 
Thank you for reading. 
Greg Shaw 
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EDITORS' INTRODUCTION 
Serving as editors for Res PZfblica XIX has been a fantastic experience. We were thrilled not 
only with the high number of submissions this year but also the quality of them all. While we 
were unable to accept every submission, each writer impressed us with their breadth of 
knowledge on their chosen topic. Even more heartening were the submissions by 
underclassmen. From gateway essays to senior seminar papers, we received a wide array of 
material for edition of Res Publica, and we encourage everyone returning for another year at 
Illinois Wesleyan University to submit again when the call for papers comes again. 
This year's. edition is centered on the origin and subsequent spread of ideas. How does 
newspaper coverage influence American attitudes on gun control? Are Confucianism and 
democracy more compatible than some scholars have suggested? Why are some right-wing 
parties more politically powerful than others? In what way is the Supreme Court still the 
"Dark Horse" of American politics? These are the questions that cut below the surface of 
our society and illuminate essential truths about how we construct the world around us. 
As Res PlIblica approaches its second decade of publication, we look back on the 
publication's impressive history. One of the few undergraduate political science journals in 
the nation, Res Publica has offered the students of Illinois Wesleyan a place to exhibit their 
writing and research for nineteen years. Over the years, Res Publica has helped students refine 
their writing and display their abilities to the public, both of which represent invaluable 
opportunities. 
We greatly appreciate the contributions of our associate editors, Lauren Burke and Patrick 
Cavanaugh, who took time out of their busy senior year schedules to provide assistance and 
feedback. Without their hard work, this year's edition of Res Pllblica would not be in your 
hands. We extend a similar sense of gratitude to the Department of Political Science faculty, 
who have pushed us to improve our analytical, writing, and research skills. It has been a 
privilege learning from and working with such inspiring individuals. Last, we would like to 
thank Karl Winter for his outstanding cover artwork, which ties together the themes of this 
year's articles and the overarching power of ideas. 
Thank you for reading; we hope you enjoy this year's edition of Res Publica! 
Nick Desideri and Ryan Winter 
iv IRES PUBLICA 
AUTHOR BIOGRAPHIES 
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Xinlin Xu is a senior Political Science major. She is a member of Pi Sigma Alpha, the Political 
Science honor society. She has been working with Scholars at Risk on human rights advocacy for 
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RADICAL RIGHT POPULIST PARTIES IN BRITAIN AND THE NETHERLANDS: 
EXPLAINING ELECTORAL SUCCESS 
Casey Plach 
Radical right-wmg populist parties have recently emerged throughout Europe, but the 
electoral success among these parties is incredibly mconsistent. In the Netherlands, Geert Wilders' 
Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV) has become established in the country's political system, while the 
British National Party (BNP) and the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) struggle to gam 
even a single seat in British parliament. Models outlining a formula for the rise and success of 
populist parties can help explain why some parties achieve an electoral breaktiuough and others do 
not. Researcher of radical right populism Pippa Norris' model of electoral success is divided mto a 
political demand side that focuses on the public grievances driving these parties, and a political 
supply side that focuses on mternal party activity as well as external factors shaping opportunity 
structure. This essay compares Britain's two radical right populist parties, the BNP and the UKIP, 
with the PVV in the Netherlands, and applies Norris' framework to explain the greater electoral 
success of the PVV. It concludes that while Britain and Netherlands are similar in terms of political 
demand, populist parties have seen more success in the Netherlands because supply-side factors are 
more favorable. 
Poptllist Parties in the U.K and the Netherlands 
The British National Party was formed in 1982 by John Tyndall when he split from the 
National Front, a far-right party for whites only. With its ideological roots in fascism, the BNP has 
struggled to gain political legitimacy and respect. Current leader Nick Griffin has called for a 
modernization of the party to change this. He denies the fascist label and instead identifies the party 
as having "ideological foundations of a twenty-fIrst-century 'popular nationalism,"'j Following 
Griffin's transformation, the BNP's platform defends "democracy, freedom, culture, and identity"2 
Despite this reconstruction, key grievances remained the same, with immigration and European 
Union membership at the forefront. However, the party's rhetoric has changed in an attempt to 
appear less radical. For example, the BNP is extremely anti-immigrant, seeing immigrants as a threat 
to British culture, and it uses nativist rhetoric in an attempt to legitimize these concerns. BNP 
members defend their stance on the grounds that multiculturalism "wipes out indigenous cultures 
and identities through homogenization" and so, by opposing it, they "[are] not racists but legitimate 
defenders of ethnic and cultural diversity."3 The BNP is also very anti-European Union because it 
sees the EU as a threat to democracy and national sovereignty. The party's target out-groups include 
1 Copsey 2007, 75 
2 "Democracy" 2010 
3 Copsey 2007, 74 
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political actors in the EU as well as immigrants within the state, especially Muslims. A vertical 
structure of antagonisms is observed, as the party attacks both the "corrupt elites" at the top of 
society and the "dangerous others" at the bottom. With these key issues driving the party, the BNP 
garners support from "deprived and less well educated members of the working class [who] feel 
under 'threat' from immigration."4 
Eleven years after the BNP's emergence, Alan Sked founded the Anti-Federalist League, 
which would later evolve into The United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) now led by Nigel 
Farage. The Anti-Federalist league was a campaign against the Maastricht Treaty, so at its inception 
the UKIP's platform solely promoted anti-EU sentiments. Realizing it could not last as a single-issue 
party, the UKIP broadened its appeals. It currently identifies itself as a "democratic, libertarian party" 
and focuses on leaving the EU and restoring democracy by empowering the people. Its manifesto 
explains its anti-EU stance and continues, "But the EU is only the biggest symptom of the real 
problem - the theft of our democracy by a powerful, remote political 'elite' which has forgotten that 
it's here to serve the people.'" The UI<JP's enemies are the mainstream politicians in both Britain 
and the ED. Immigration is also a concern, but the UKIP takes an economic perspective focusing on 
limited jobs and welfare, unlike the BNP's cultural protectionist stance. The absence of overtly racist 
rhetoric has helped the UI<IP be more successful and appear as a more respectable party than the 
BNP. The party's basis of mobilization consists of Eurosceptic voters and ordinary, working-class 
people, but it also attracts some dissatisfied Conservatives. 
In 2002, almost a decade after the UKIP was founded, the Netherlands saw the rise of the 
Pim Fortuyn List (LPF), a radical right party populist that set the stage for the emergence of Geert 
Wilder's Party for Freedom in 2006. Pim Fortuyn founded the LPF in response to the "Purple 
Coalition" coalition formed by three of the mainstream parties who, he felt, ignored the people. He 
was killed just before the 2002 election, but the party gained 17 percent of the vote and twenty-six 
seats in Dutch Parliament.6 However, the LPF's success was short-lived. With the death of Fortuyn, 
the party lost its organizational leadership and experienced internal conflict, ultimately leading to its 
collapse. Just a few years later, Geert Wilders took over as the country's new populist leader. He 
broke from the mainstream right People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) after 
disagreeing with the parliament leader about Turkey obtaining EU membership and founded Geert 
Wilders' Dutch Party for Freedom. His party focuses on the same issues as the BNP and UI<IP, with 
the major concerns being EU membership, immigration, and restoring democracy. Target out-groups 
are also similar, as the PVV is very hostile to political elites working for the EU and the mainstream 
4 Goodwin 2012, 20 
5 "The Only" 
6 Van Kessel 2011, 74 
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Dutch parties, as well as to Muslim immigrants. For Wilders, "Islam is perceived as a violent 
'ideology' and Dutch culture should be protected against the process of Islamisation."7 Like the 
BNP, he employs nativist rhetoric in an attempt to restore national sovereignty by means of bringing 
ownership back to the "ttue and good people," also referred to as the heartland. The PVV mainly 
draws support from Eurosceptic voters and so-called "losers of modernization," who have lost their 
jobs to outsourcing, technological development, and other effects of globalization. They are 
considered the "ordinary hardworking men and women"- a phrase that Wilders is never hesitant to 
employ.8 
Demalld 
The demand side of Norris' model focuses on public grievances and how these grievances 
drive the emergence of new political parties. Touching on the most prominent concerns among 
countries in \Vestern Europe, Norris explains, "the rising salience of cultural protectionism, in a 
backlash against globalization and population migration, has altered the public agenda in each 
countty, providing sporadic openings for new parties.'" Public grievances increase electoral demand, 
and the higher the electoral demand for PRR parties, the more likely they are to succeed. 
Furthermore, if there is dissatisfaction among the public, voters are more likely to be receptive to 
parties who address issues that mainstream parties have ignored or failed to solve. Dissatisfaction in 
Britain and the Netherlands has stemmed from sttuctural changes both countries have experienced in 
recent years. Both countries became member states of the European Union, were affected by the 
economic crisis of 2008, are subject to negative effects of globalization, and have experienced an 
increase in immigration. These changes produced electoral demand and led to the emergence of 
populist parties. 
To determine what grievances are present in Britain and the Netherlands, data from the 
Eurobarometer Public Opinion Survey of 2012 can be examined. One question on the survey asks, 
''What do you think are the two most important issues facing (OUR COUNTRY) at the moment?" 
The three highest ranked issues in the United Kingdom were unemployment (40 percent), the 
economic situation (30 percent), and immigration (24 percent). In the Netherlands, they were the 
economic situation (55 percent), health and social security (46 percent), and unemployment (32 
percent). Unemployment and the economic situation were concerns in both countries, which 
demonstrates that on the macro level the public has similar grievances. 
Populist radical right parties in Western Europe have found success capitalizing on issues of 
democracy, globalization, and immigration, all of which are public concerns in the Netherlands and 
7 Van Kessel 2011, 75 
8 Ibid., 84 
, Norris 2005, 4 
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the United I<::ingdom. According to a May 2004 Eurobarometer survey, 27 percent of Dutch 
respondents and 23 percent of British respondents indicated that they were not very satisfied with 
the way democracy works in their country. Satisfaction rates were similar on all measures, which 
indicates that both countries were experiencing similar gtievances. Populist parties were gaining 
ground when this survey was taken, and with about a quarter of the public in each country expressing 
dissatisfaction with their democratic process, the demand was present for a populist party to 
respond. 
In terms of globalization, results from the May 2012 Eurobarometer survey indicated that 24 
percent of Dutch respondents and 37 percent of Btitish respondents believed globalization 
represents a threat to employment and companies. This is another public concern, common in both 
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom; One outcome of globalization is an increase in 
immigration rates, which is an issue that has not escaped notice in Western Europe. Currently, the 
foreign born population in Netherlands makes up 11.2 percent of the total population, and in Britain 
12.9 percent.to The public is wary of the immigrant population and high immigration rates, and 
populist parties are acting on these concerns. 
In both the United I<::ingdom and the Netherlands, public demand is present for a party that 
offers simple solutions to restore democracy, protect the country from the negative effects of 
globalization, and limit immigration. The opportunity exists in both countries for radical right 
populist parties to respond and flnd success. Overall, the demand actually appears to be slightly 
stronger in Britain. Immigration, a central focus for all three populist parties, ranks among the U.K.'s 
top three concerns and 13 percent more of the British public views globalization as a threat. 
However, demand is not a direct indicator of success. This is especially apparent in the 2010 general 
election results. In Britain, the UKIP gained 3.2 percent of the vote, and the BNP gained 1.9 percent, 
but neither won a seat in parliament." In the Netherlands' 2010 general election, the PVV gained 
15.5 percent of the vote, which earned it twenty-four seats out of 150 in parliament.12 While both 
countries are similar in terms of political demand, the PVV has clearly seen greater electoral success, 
not only in seats gained but also in overall share of the vote. To explain this difference, political 
supply-side factors must be considered. 
StlPPfy (Extema� 
Norris explains that demand alone is not enough to guarantee the success of populist parties. 
She introduces a supply side, which "focus[es] upon patterns of party competition, including where 
mainstream parties decide to place themselves ... as well as the actions taken by the radical right 
10 OEeD 2013 
11 Denyer 2010, 593 
12 Van Kessel 2011, 74 
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themselves."" External supply-side factors include electoral conditions, ideological space, availability 
of the electorate, and the media. These factors are outside of party control, but in certain instances 
they can contribute to the electoral success of populist parties. 
A country's electoral conditions are critical in deciding how many seats a party will gain. 
Although the BNP and the UKIP do not hold any seats in the British Parliament, they do have a 
combined fourteen seats in the European Parliament. This difference has only one possible 
explanation: the electoral system. In the United Kingdom, general elections use a first-past-the-post 
(FPTP) system where the candidate who earns the most votes wins the seat. As Duverger's law 
states, plurality rule voting tends to produce two-party systems, which "makes it rather difficult for 
new political forces (populist or otherwise) to make an electoral breakthrough."!4 This type of system 
can also discourage the electorate from voting for a third party candidate because their vote will most 
likely not carry any significance. The BNP and UKIP received a combined 5.1 percent of the vote in 
the last election, but "the FPTP electoral system continues to restrict their ability to impact on 
national level politicS."15 
Because the European Parliament uses a proportional representation system (FR), the BNP 
and UKIP have experienced some electoral success at this level. In this system, candidates gain seats 
in proportion to the number of votes they receive. The Netherlands also uses a PR system for its 
general election, which in part explains the electoral success of the PVV. The system has no 
established threshold, meaning that parties only need .67 percent of the popular vote to gain a seat." 
The electoral conditions naturally encourage new parties to enter the political arena. In fact, 
"[b]etween 1946 and 2003, 18 new parties have gained entry into parliament."!7 The PVV has 
benefitted from this open and accessible system, while the BNP and UKIP are working under 
conditions that impede electoral success. 
Other actors in the political system also have an effect on a party's success. Mainstream 
parties play a role because their position on the political spectrum and whether or not they respond 
to the concerns of the public determines how much ideological space exists for a populist party to 
emerge. In the United Kingdom, mainstream parties are much more in tune with public grievances. 
They will respond to constituent concerns and often "shift policies to mop up temporary forms of 
discontent."18 In fact, the Conservative party has even used populist rhetoric itself, "portray[ing] the 
13 Norris 2005, 14 
14 Fella 2008,182 
15 Ibid., 197 
" Lucardie 2008, 152 
17 Ibid., 152 
18 John and Margetts 2009,497 
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New Labour as an out-of-touch liberal metropolitan elite selling out the British people."" This does 
not bode well for populist parties who insist that all parts of the establishment are unresponsive to 
the people. Rather than gaining the political legitimacy that they aim for, these parties are restricted to 
the role of a pressure group on established parties. For example, the BNP and the UKIP both 
concentrate on immigration, but mainstream parties have responde� to the issue as well, 
undermining their efforts. In fact, many might agree with Matthew Goodwin that the "Conservatives 
have offered a more credible brand to citizens anxious over immigration."'o Established parties in the 
U.K. present themselves as a more legitimate option and since they respond to public concerns, there 
is very little ideological space for a populist party to succeed. 
In contrast, mainstream parties in the Netherlands have converged ideologically and are 
unresponsive to public concerns, opening political space where populist parties can thrive. With a 
highly consociational political system in the Netherlands, these parties have not established distinct 
platforms and have converged in such a way that voters cannot distinguish between them.21 The 
Labour Party, for example, attempted to address multiculturalism and the public's concerns over 
cultural preservation, but they gave up and "by 2003 . . . little was separating the three mainstream 
parties on this issue."22 This allowed for populist parties, such as the PVV, to step in and be the 
answer voters were looking for. In addition, mainstream parties in the Netherlands are on the whole 
less likely to respond to public grievances. Unlike mainstream parties in the U.K. that at least attempt 
to deal with high immigration rates, "[e]stablished parties [in the Netherlands] failed to recognize that 
citizens actually were concerned about the perceived problems of immigration."23 This provides the 
perfect opportunity for the PVV to claim that the establishment is ignoring important issues and that 
the people are not being heard. 
Even if political parties are responsive to public grievances, the availability of the electorate 
is an important factor in determining the support a populist party will obtain. With the UK's highly 
structured patty system, voters are not very receptive to new parties like tlle BNP or UKIP. 
Availability in large part depends on how tied voters are to their respective parties, and in the U.K. 
mainstream parties have been relatively stable and remain legitimate choices. A State of the Nation 
Poll measuring views on the BNP indicates that only 9 percent of self-identified Conservatives 
"might vote for" the BNP in the future.24 There are some dissatisfied conservatives, but for the most 
part voters are loyal to their respective parties and would not readily abandon them for a new one. 
19 Fella 2008, 197 
20 Goodwin 2012, 17 
21 Van Kessel 2011, 78 
22 Ibid., 79 
21 Ibid. 
24 John and Mar getts 2009, 507 
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Meanwhile, the electorate in the Netherlands is highly receptive to new parties because of 
structural changes the country experienced in the twentieth century. Before World War II, Dutch 
society was organized according to different symbolic pillars, including a Protestant, Catholic, and 
Socialist pillar. Schools, media, and political parties were divided according to these pillars, but this 
system broke down and society experienced drastic changes, especially in the political system. Within 
this pillarized structure "the electorate largely voted along the cleavage lines of religion and social 
class .. " By the turn of the twenty-first century, however, the explanatory power of this factor had 
become very 10w."25 Voters are no longer tied to the pillars that in the past had defined all their 
choices, and today parties are still developing to respond to the new social structure. This upheaval 
means that voters are "less loyal to traditional parties and ready to give the benefit of the doubt to 
new parties."" The PVV is one new party trying to establish itself in this new political structure and 
with such a highly receptive electorate, it has been able to experience success. 
Another factor that can help or hurt a party in its attempts to find electoral success is the 
media. In Britain, the media is very critical of the UKIP and the BNP. In her study on populist 
parties and their relation to the popular media, Tjitske Akkerman notes: 
One of the reasons that the BNP is less successful is that it faces a less favorable discursive 
oppottunity structure. In contrast to the PVV, a party that is treated by Dutch political 
parties and the media as a normal parry, the BNP has been generally stigmatized by leading 
politicians and the media as a racist or fascist patty.27 
The BNP's platform is controversial, and its attempts to legitimize itself are stunted by the media. 
While less radical than the BNP, the UKIP also faces trouble in establishing legitimacy. It directs its 
efforts in distancing itself from the BNP, but is still viewed by the media and by many voters as 
radical. 
As Akkerman points out, the PVV is considered normal and established in the Netherlands, 
even though it employs much of the same rhetoric as the BNP and the UKIP. The party is highly 
institutionalized and has enough support to be considered a normal part of the political system, 
which is why the media is less critical. After pillarization, parties were no longer supported by mass 
media, and for the most part the media has attempted to remain neutral. Therefore, the party's "core 
consists of a leader and a parliamentary group that is very effectively fenced off for outsiders in 
general and journalists in particular."28 Geert Wilders is the only formal member of the PVV, so it is 
not a very open organization. Without the media working against it, the PVV has an easier time 
developing a positive reputation. 
25 Van Kessel 2011, 77 
26 Lucar die 2008, 155 
27 Akkerman 2009, 935 
28 Akker man 2009, 935 
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Although many factors work outside of party control, there are supply-side factors that allow 
parties to direct their own success. Further criticizing the one-sided model that only focuses on 
demand, Norris explains, "demand-side analysis is too simple and instead we need to give far greater 
emphasis to what parties can do through thelr own actions as strategic agents."29 Here she is referring 
to the internal supply-side factors, which include leadership and party organization. Parries have 
control over these factors, so it is their responsibility to craft favorable conditions and create their 
own political success. 
Populist parties regard the public as a homogenous body, so a charismatic leader who 
embodies the people plays a central role in a party's development and success. In Britain, the BNP 
has struggled with leadership and building party reputation. John Tyndall, the original leader of the 
BNP, embraced the fascist label and took extreme stances on many issues, believing that "all that was 
required [in the quest for political power] was undiluted racism combined with strong and disciplined 
central leadership."30 Not only did Tyndall fail to deliver electoral success, he tainted the image of the 
BNP, which made restoring political respectability a central concern for Griffin when he took over. 
Griffin directed his energy into modernizing the party and continually rejecting the extreme label the 
BNP gained under Tyndall. However, the public remains skeptical because of the image Tyndall 
promoted in the past. His leadership harmed the BNP, which is so "delegitimized by association with 
fascism and violence" that it "has no hope of becoming a serious national force."31 
In contrast, strong leadership has been consistent among radical right populist parties in the 
Netherlands. Before Geert Wilders, the current leader of the PVV, Pim Fortuyn was the country's 
central populist leader. He was charismatic and took a less extreme stance on many issues, causing 
"the stigma of 'extreme right' . . .  [to be] broken for good."" When Wilders took center stage, the 
public was responsive because Fortuyn previously established a respectable image. However, in 
comparison to Fortuyn, Wilders is "more radical in regards to immigration and integration" and "he 
criticizes the establishment more harshly."33 Because Fortuyn did not taint the party's image like 
Tyndall did with the BNP, Wilders does not meet resistance for his more extreme positions. Success 
is, in part, dependent upon the leader and past leaders who worked to shape the party. The PVV has 
this advantage, which contributes to its electoral success. 
Party organization also impacts electoral success, and is critical for a party that wishes to 
institutionalize and compete with mainstream parties. In the United Kingdom, "[b]oth the BNP and 
29 Norris 2005, 14 
30 Copsey 2007, 66 
31 Eatwell1998, 153 
32 Mudde 2007, 211 
33 Van Kessel 2011, 75 
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UKIP have experienced infighting and continual organizational problems which jeopardize their 
electoral chances."34 Over time, they have made improvements in basic party operations, such as 
Internet development and recruitment efforts. However, the biggest challenge that remains is for the 
radical right to become a united force. After various leadership disputes, both the BNP and UKIP 
have become more stable and internally united, but they still compete against each other for votes, 
which takes away from the success the radical right can achieve as a whole. 
The PVV, on the other hand, is united and well-organized, which has allowed it to more 
easily become an established party in the Dutch political system. Party operations are directed by 
Wilders, who "managed to build up a united party organization under his own firm leadership while 
sending out an appealing message to a large share of Dutch voters."35 The PVV may be running 
smoothly now, but since Wilders is its only formal member the party's future may be at risk. The 
LPF completely fell apart after Fortuyn's death because, like Wilders, he was the core of his party and 
made all the decisions. To maintain efficient party operations, Wilders may allocate some of his 
control or, in his absence, the PVV would likely face the same fate as the LPF. 
Conclusion 
As Norris explains, "the key to radical right success depends upon the complex interaction 
of public demand and party supply under conditions of imperfect competition in a regulated electoral 
marketplace."36 Success cannot be explained by supply or demand alone, but in the cases of Britain 
and the Netherlands where demand is quite similar, differences in supply-side factors can be 
examined to determine why populist parties are more likely to succeed in the Netherlands. In terms 
of demand, the PVV, BNP, and UK1P all focus on the same ideals in an attempt to respond to 
public grievances stemming from immigration, the EU, globalization, and a perceived loss of 
democracy. These grievances drive the emergence of populist parties, and '\vill continue to cultivate 
opportunity for the extreme right."37 However, to explain the success of these parties, both internal 
and external supply side factors need to be examined. 
In the Netherlands, supply factors created a favorable opportunity structure for Geert 
Wilders' Dutch Party for Freedom to emerge and experience electoral success. With an open 
electoral system, consensus-oriented politics, and depillarizarion of Dutch society, the Netherlands 
was ready and available for a party like the PVV." Internal factors also play a role: the PVV is a well­
organized party with strong leadership. Supply-side factors in Britain are quite the opposite, and have 
gready harmed populist parties' chances at success. In Britain, the FPTP system is the root of many 
34 John an d Margetts 2009, 501 
35 Van Kessel 201 1, 85 
36 Norris 2005, 4 
37 Goodwin 2012, 28 
38 Lucardie 2008, 165 
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electoral struggles the BNP and the UKIP face. It not only makes winning seats difficult, but also 
leads to an extremely structured party system, in which outside parties cannot compete. These parties 
may have answers to electorate concerns, but that does not mean the electorate is available and 
willing to vote for them. Lack of organization and leadership also hindered the success of the BNP 
and UKIP. Parties have control over these internal supply-side factors, but even if they can work 
them in their favor, factors outside of party control will still be present, preventing populist parties in 
Britain from experiencing electoral success on par with their Dutch counterparts. 
RES PUBLICA ILl 
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VICIOUS CYCLE OR BUSINESS CYCLE?: EXPLAINING POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN 
NORTHERN IRELAND AFTER THE TROUBLES 
Lauren Burke 
Abstract: Tbere aI. CIImntIY tivo sebools of tbollgbt tbat seek to explain tbe persistence of political violence in 
Nortbe", Irelant/, one Ivitb a sociopolitical foclls and tbe other Ivith an economic foclls. Expanding on past economic 
tbeary, this paper lItilizes several mllitiple ,.gmsion models to test tbe applicability of the economic school's rei alive 
deprivation theory in the fifteen years since the T rolfbles Ivere foro/allY ettded Ivith tbe signing of the Good Friday 
Agreement. Tbe basis of this theory is that as economic conditions Ivorsen in a given area, the llumber rf acts 0/ 
political violettce shollld also increase. This stutjy specificallY looked at the efficts of a lising II11"'pIOYlllet1t rate and its 
relationship to political violmce. !l7bile 110 slfcb "lationship could be obsemet/, there IVas a statisticallY significant 
relationship betlvml Gross DOlllestic HOllsebold II/conle and the nllmber of acts ofpolitical violence, Ivhieb SIlPPOlts 
"Iative deprivation theory. These findings ilIpIY that policymakers Iii Northem II.land should foclls their ejfiJlts not on 
reducing the IlIlemplq;lJlle1lt rate bill ratber 011 increasiNg the average level cif income. 
INTRODUCTION 
From 1969 to 1998, the ethnonationalist conflict in Northern Ireland called the Troubles 
was "easily the most intense violent conflict in Europe."39 More than three thousand people lost 
their lives and approximately three percent of the population sustained some form of physical 
injury.4o Although the level of politically motivated violence has subsided considerably since the 
signing of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, it continues on a smaller scale to this day. 
Building on past research on the connection between economic conditions and political 
violence, the goal of this study was to determine whether or not the unemployment rate had an effect 
on political violence in Northern Ireland in the fifteen-year period following the Good Friday 
Agreement. Conventional wisdom seems to be that a reduction in the unemployment rate will lead 
to a decrease in the level of political violence, and several prominent scholars and policymakers hold 
this belief. In the wake of the Unionist protests that began last December in Belfast, determining 
whether or not this perceived connection is supported by statistical evidence would allow the 
government to pursue policies that hinder the growth of hostile movements. 
This study utilized several multiple regression models controlling for various economic and 
political factors in order to isolate the effects of the unemployment rate on political violence and 
thereby test the hypothesis that as the unemployment rate increases, the number of politically 
motivated acts of violence will also increase. None of the various regression models found a 
significant correlation between the unemployment rate and the number of politically motivated acts 
of violence in Northern Ireland. However, political violence did show a significant correlation with 
one control variable: annual Gross Disposable Household Income (GDHI). This fInding suggests 
that although unemployment is not a significant predictor of political violence, other factors 
39 Hayes and McAllister 2005, 599 
40 Hayes and McAllister 2005 
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impacting the economic health of the country do make a difference. The correlation between GDHI 
and violence also lends support to the relative deprivation theory and suggests that further study of 
the impact of other economic variables on political violence would be a worthwhile investment, both 
for policymakers in the U.K. and for economic and political theorists in other post-industrialized 
conflict areas. 
ROOTS OF VIOLENCE: LANDLORDS, FENIANISM, AND THE BORDER QUESTION 
Today, Northern Ireland is fairly evenly divided between the primarily Catholic Nationalists 
and the primarily Protestant Loyalists. The term Nationalist has been used interchangeably with the 
term Republican due to this group's desire to incorporate the six Northern Irish counties into the 
current Republic of Ireland, thereby uniting the entire island of Ireland to form a thirty-two-county 
Republic. On the other side of the conflict are the Loyalists, often called Unionists because they 
wish to remain a part of the United Kingdom and are vehemently against the proposed change. 
These mutually exclusive goals are deeply rooted in the groups' cultural, religious, and political 
histories. 
The Catholic minority in Northern Ireland, typically of native Irish descent, was for centuries 
at a relative disadvantage compared to the Protestant majority, who often trace their ancestry back to 
the British settlers who colonized the island. As the Tudors, and subsequently Oliver Cromwell, 
attempted to impose the new Anglican Church upon their unwilling Irish subjects, they confiscated 
land from Irish Catholics and reallocated it to loyal British Protestants.4! These new landlords 
established large plantations and enforced discriminatory policies that barred Catholics from 
participating in Parliament.42 The Great Potato Famine from 1845 to 1849 exacerbated tensions 
between Catholic peasants and the mostly Protestant landlords:' who developed a reputation for 
evicting or otherwise mistreating their starving tenants." The famine's legacy along with continued 
denial of political power to Catholics made many view Great Britain as an unwelcome, imperialist 
power. It was this perception that gave rise to Fenianism: the revolutionary, nationalist movement 
aimed at achieving Irish independence. 
More moderate, nonviolent political actors attempted to achieve autonomy by pushing for 
Home Rule, a policy that would have allowed Ireland to have its own Parliament separate from 
Westminster.45 The movement met its fiercest opposition in the heavily Protestant Ulster province, 
which includes the six counties that today constitute Northern Ireland. It was out of this opposition 
41 Toomey 2013 
42 Holwell 1997 
43 Feeney, "Parnellism and Home Rule" 
44 Donnelly 2011 
45 Feeney, "Parnellism and Home Rule" 
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that the Unionist movement was born. 46 At the conclusion of the Anglo-Irish War, the six counties 
of Northern Ireland were the only ones that established a Home Rule government; the rest of the 
island was granted Free State status and, ultimately, independence.47 
By intentionally partitioning Ireland in a manner that guaranteed a Protestant majority, the 
British created conditions that generated conflict. While the new Irish Free State was overwhelmingly 
Catholic and therefore protected the Catholics' rights, the Protestant majority in the North ensured 
that the interests of the Catholic population were never sufficiently addressed and that systematic 
discrimination against them continued.48 Unionists not only dominated the police force, the civil 
service, and local government, but they also enjoyed job and housing options that were denied to 
Catholics. This imbalance persisted until the 1960s, when Catholics inspired by the American Civil 
Rights Movement attempted to draw attention to their struggles through participation in peaceful 
protests. These protests evoked strong Unionist backlash and, to prevent violence, the government 
banned all political demonstrations in an effort to prevent rioting. On October 5, 1968, Irish 
Catholics defied one such ban in the city of Derry and were met with a violent response from the 
Unionist-dominated Royal Ulster Constabulary.4' This highly publicized incident is considered by 
many to be the starting date of what have been euphemistically termed the Troubles. For the next 
thirty years, Loyalist and Republican paramilitaries engaged in a "Dirty War" that claimed the lives of 
more than three thousand people, most of them civilians. 50 Fighting between the major paramilitary 
organizations was officially ended by the Good Friday Agreement of 1998, although radical splinter 
groups continue to commit acts of political violence to this day. The focus of this study will be 
determining which factors are driving the violent actions of these new organizations. 
EXPLANATIONS FOR THE USE OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE 
The Sociopolitical Explanation 
Social science explanations for political violence in Northern Ireland fall into two main 
schools of thought: the sociopolitical explanation and the economic explanation. The sociopolitical 
explanation contends that political violence in Northern Ireland occurs because the two major 
ethnonationalist groups in the region continue to view their interests as mutually exclusive. Although 
they constitute a majority in Northern Ireland, the Unionists are in fact a minority on the island of 
Ireland as a whole. According to incorporation theory,51 also known as the "see-sa\v" theory,52 each 
group's minority status makes it feel insecure. As a result, each group tends to view the political 
46 Feeney, "A Deepening Crisis" 
47 Feeney, "Achieving Freed om: Ireland 1921-39" 
48 Feeney, "Northern Ireland , 1920-98" 
49 Melaugh 2013 
50 Melaugh 2013 
51 Thompson 1989 
52 Maney 2005 
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advancement of the other as a threat to its own security and tries to assert its own power by 
responding violendy to the enemy's political victories. Exposure to political violence leads to an 
acceptance of violence ,vithin these communities, perpetuating a cycle of attacks and retributive 
action that some expect to continue indefInitely.53 In essence, proponents of this view believe that 
the only way to forge a lasting peace is by maintaining that peace for long enough that it becomes the 
new norm. 
The Ecollomic Explallatioll 
The economic explanation seeks to refIne this belief in a never-ending cycle of violence and 
argues that spikes in the level of paramilitary activity are correlated with economic conditions. One 
of the most studied factors by proponents of this theory has been the unemployment rate. Northern 
Ireland has suffered from relatively high unemployment compared to the rest of the United 
Kingdom,54 and it is widely believed by both scholars and policymakers that unemployment is an 
underlying cause of political violence.55 Proponents of this theory argue that the unemployed have a 
tendency to blame society for their hardships and-more disturbingly-to express greater support 
for "violent change" to the political system.56 However, others have found negative correlations 
between unemployment rate and violence,57 attributed to the increased political apathy of the 
unemployed58 or the increasing scarcity of resources available to terrorist organizations.59 
The most relevant economic theories to the Northern Itish case are the relative deptivation 
theory and the power-conflict variant of deprivation theory. Relative deptivation theory states that if 
there is a "gap between expected and achieved welfare" for a population, they are likely to express 
their frustration violendy.'O In the context of the Troubles, this theory would imply that the high 
unemployment rate for all citizens led to an "equality of misery"61 that exacerbated the underlying 
sociopolitical conflict and led to the Troubles. 
Although results of studies working under this assumption failed to find any positive 
correlation between the unemployment rate and violence,62 some scholars have argued that this 
occurred because economic hardships were not equally distributed." In the 1970s, census data 
53 McAloney et al. 2009; Hayes and McAllister 2001 
54 Thompson 1989 
55 Hewitt 1984; Thompson 1989 
56 Breakwell 1986 
57 Berman et al. 2011 
58 Breakwell 1986 
59 Berman et al. 2011 
60 Thompson 1989, 677 
61 Thompson 1989, 681 
62 Thompson 1989; White 1993 
63 Honaker 2004; Maney 2005 
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showed that the unemployment rate for Catholics was more than twice the rate for Protestants.64 
Because the Catholics were economically worse off than the Protestant majority during the Troubles, 
their comparative disadvantage may have driven them to participate in violent Republican 
movements. This hypothesis reflects the "power-conflict" variant of deprivation theory,65 which 
states that a group's absolute economic status is a less significant predictor of its likelihood to 
respond violently than its economic status relative to other segments of the population. Empirical 
studies of fluctuations in the unemployment rate during the Troubles found that higher 
unemployment was positively correlated with acts of Republican paramilitary violence but not with 
Loyalist violence," and although separate unemployment data for Catholics and Protestants is 
unavailable, when these values are estimated, high Catholic unemployment was correlated with 
increased Republican violenceP 
Since the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, the socioeconomic gap between Catholics and 
Protestants has narrowed considerably.68 Data from the 2011 Census show a 3 percent gap in the 
unemployment rate of Protestants and Catholics,6'J suggesting that the anti-discrimination measures 
of the Good Friday Agreement have in fact improved the employment prospects of members of the 
Catholic community. The fact that political violence persists in Northern Ireland despite the 
decreasing gap in the unemployment rates of these groups suggests that while the power-conflict 
variant of deprivation theory might have explained political violence during the Troubles, it does not 
explain the persistence of violence in the post-Good Friday Agreement period. If a correlation 
between unemployment and violence persists as expected, this would suggest that the relative 
deprivation theory, with its focus on the overall unemployment rate rather than on the unequal 
treatment of Catholics and Protestants, would be applicable to this case. More broadly, this would 
suggest that cohorts with an "equality of misery" are likely to engage in political violence. 
EXPLAINING VIOLENCE AFTER THE GOOD FRIDAY AGREEMENT 
While there is undoubtedly merit to the claim that acts of sectarian violence generate more 
violence in response, the sociopolitical theory fails to address the immediate conditions that will be 
most likely to ignite violent action and, consequently, leaves policymakers with few opportunities to 
respond to the problem. In contrast, relative deprivation theory suggests that sectarian violence 
occurs not because the groups are too different to peacefully coexist but rather because they are 
experiencing a common problem. If high unemployment is truly the underlying cause of civil unrest, 
64 Blackaby et a1. 2007 
65 Maney 2005 
66 Maney 2005; \'V'hite 1993 
67 Honaker 2004 
68 Blackaby et al. 2007 
69 Beatty 2013 
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then policymakers have a greater capacity to handle the problem or at the very least to pursue 
policies that may help them do so. 
The United Kingdom has been investing in projects to improve the economy of Northern 
Ireland for years, believing that a reduction in unemployment would lead to a reduction in political 
violence throughout the country.70 The focus of this research will be determining the extent to 
which the unemployment rate has affected political violence in the fifteen years following the 
Troubles. If a strong relationship between the variables can be determined, then the continuing 
support for economic initiatives as political violence deterrents can be more readily justified. Based 
on the narrowing unemployment gap between the ethnonationalist groups and the assumptions of 
the relative deprivation theory, the following hypothesis was proposed: As the unemployment rate 
increases, the number of politically motivated acts of violence will also increase. 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
In order to test this hypothesis, the present study utilized multiple regression models to 
analyze statistics collected by the Northern Irish government. Quarterly unemployment data from 
the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Investment of Northern Ireland was used to measure the 
main independent variable, the unemployment rate. Because it is widely acknowledged that 
participants in political violence tend to be young and male,7! separate regression equations were run 
controlling for age and gender in order to determine whether or not unemployment for those 
particular groups had an effect on the level of political violence. In order to rule out potential 
intervening variables, the model also controlled for both Regional GDHI and political attitudes over 
time. The measurement of political attitudes utilized three categories: Unionist, Nationalist, and 
Other, Neither, or Don't Know, 72 
The dependent variable, political violence, was measured using data collected by the Police 
Service of Northern Ireland (pSNI). Specifically, this study utilized statistics taken from the PSNI 
Security Situation report. I combined the total number of violent incidents per quarter in four 
different categories of violent action into an aggregate total to get a clearer picture of how the level of 
political violence varied over the fifteen-year period covered by the study. The categories included in 
the aggregate measure are as follows: paramilitary style shootings, paramilitary style assaults, bombing 
incidents related to the Security Situation, and shooting incidents related to the Security Situation. In 
the time period included in this study, there were a total of 6,328 incidents. The use of this relatively 
narrow definition of Security Situation-related violence rather than a broader study of sectarian crime 
70 Hewitt 1984 
71 Hayes and McAllister 2005 
72 After initially controlling for religious affiliation, I ultimately d ecided to omit that variable from my mod el 
d ue to a lack of variation over time. 
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allowed me to ensure that the incidents studied had an underl)�ng political motivation and were not 
purely acts of ethnic hatred. 
DATA AND ANALYSIS 
My results have led me to reject my hypothesis that the unemployment rate has an effect on 
political violence in Northern Ireland. For every category that I analyzed-regardless of time lag, 
age group, or gender controls-the unemployment rate did not have a significant relationship with 
the level of political violence in Northern Ireland in the post-Good Friday Agreement period. The 
consistency of these fmdings strongly refutes the possibility of a causal relationship between my 
independent and dependent variables. 
It is worth noting that the unemployment rate might not completely capture the 
employment situation in Northern Ireland. The unemployment rate is a percentage equal to the 
number of unemployed individuals divided by the number of workers participating in the labor 
force. The labor force is the sum of employed and unemployed workers, not the total working-age 
population. Therefore, the unemployment rate excludes so-called "discouraged workers"­
individuals who have been unemployed for so long that they are no longer searching for work and 
have dropped out of the labor force. It may well be that the long-term unemployed and 
discouraged workers are more likely to have politically-motivated grievances and to act more 
violently than those individuals who are included in the total unemployment rate. This is a 
possibility that should be taken into account in future research on this matter. 
Despite the absence of a relationship between political violence and the unemployment rate, 
the relative deprivation theory still appears to hold true for the period under study. Another 
economic indicator-Gross Domestic Household Income-showed a significant negative 
correlation with political violence in each of the six models considered.73 The U.K. Office for 
National Statistics defined the GDHI as "the amount of money left available \vithin the household 
sector for spending or saving, after expenditure associated with income, for example, taxes and 
social contributions, property ownership and provision for future pension income. It is calculated 
gross of any deductions for capital consumption." The regression models used in this study 
showed that as the total GDHI increases by £1 billion, the total number of Security Situation­
related incidents decreased by between twenty-four and twenty-nine incidents, depending on the 
other variables used in the model. Each of these correlations was statistically significant at the 
0.001 level, indicating that there is an extremely small likelihood that the relationship occurred by 
73 Significant results are ind icated on the tables by und erlining. For all results, * ind icates that the result is 
significant at the 0.10 level, ** ind icates that the result is significant at the 0.05 level, and *** ind icates that the 
result is significant at the 0.001 level. 
chance. While unemployment itself does not appear to influence the level of violence, income and 
other economic factors almost certainly make a contribution. 
Shifts in political beliefs also appear to be influencing the level of political violence in 
Northern Ireland. In Model 3, which utilized a one-quarter unemployment rate lag, the results 
indicated that a one percentage point increase in the number of people reporting a Unionist political 
affiliation led to roughly nine fewer Security Situation incidents. Model 4 indicates an eight incident 
increase for every one percentage point increase in the proportion of respondents identifying as 
Nationalists and a fourteen incident increase for every one percentage point increase in the 
proportion of those not affiliating with either party. The other models showed similar patterns. 
These results are inconsistent with the idea that the political divide between Unionists and 
Republicans is the cause of violence and the data show that an increase in nonaffiliated individuals 
is a contributing factor. 
While the increase in violence corresponding with an increase in the percentage of 
respondents identifying as Republican-the group that has historically been involved in rebellious 
activities-seems to make logical sense, the fact that an increase in Unionist affiliation leads to a 
decrease in paramilitary violence is somewhat puzzling. It might be posited that Unionists are less 
likely in the post-Good Friday Agreement period to participate in paramilitary acts of violence than 
are Republicans, but the raw data refute this claim. Since 1998, Loyalists have been responsible for 
685 of the 1,181 paramilitary style shootings reported in Northern Ireland through the final quarter 
of 2012, compared to the 496 such shootings carried out by Republicans. With respect to 
Paramilitary Style assaults, Loyalists were behind 948 of the 1,412 incidents, whereas Republicans 
were responsible for 464. The cause of these discrepancies is a subject that deserves further study 
in the future. 
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Regression Modell: Percent Unionist 
M dI S o e 
Model 
1 
ummary 
R 
.698 
Coefficients 
(Constant) 
R Sguare 
.487 
Unemployment Rate All Persons 
Total GDHI (£ Billions) 
Political Beliefs Percent Other/ 
Neither/Don't Know 
Political Beliefs: Percent Unionist 
Adjusted R Std. Error of 
Square the Estimate 
.443 55.82 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
B Std. Error t 
808.57 250.04 3.23 
-10.40 8.66 -1.20 
-25.75*** 6.84 -3.76 
5.06 5.22 .97 
-8.79** 4.09 -2.15 
Regression Model 2: Percent Nationalist 
M d I S  1 0 e 
Model 
2 
ummary 
R 
.688 
Coefficients 
(Constant) 
R Sguare 
.473 
Unemployment Rate All Persons 
Total GDHI (£ Billions) 
Political Beliefs Percent Other/ 
Neither/Don't Know 
Percent Nationalist 
Adjusted R Std. Error of 
Sguare the Estimate 
.428 56.57 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
B Std. Error t 
-43.19 227.18 -.19 
-9.53 8.81 -1.08 
-24.51 *** 6.85 -3.58 
12.84* 6.71 1.91 
7.99* 4.42 1.81 
Sig. 
.002 
.236 
.000 
.337 
.037 
Sig. 
.850 
.285 
.001 
.062 
.077 
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Regression Model 3: Percent Unionist, Lagged One Quarter Unemployment Rate 
M d I S  o e ummary 
Adjusted R Std. Error of 
Model R R Square Square the Estimate 
3 .710 .504 .461 55.45 
Coefficients 
Unstandarclized Coefficients 
B Std. Error t Sig. 
(Constant) 836.11 254.24 3.29 .002 
Lagged lQ Unemployment Rate -12.27 9.47 -1.30 .202 All Persons 
Total GDHI (£ Billions) -27.77*** 7.13 -3.90 .000 
Political Beliefs Percent Other/ 5.74 5.19 1.10 .275 Neither/Don't Know 
Percent Unionist -8.86** 4.05 -2.19 .034 
Regression Model 4: Percent Nationalist, Lagged One Quarter Unemployment Rate 
M dI S o e ummary 
Adjusted R Std. Error of 
Model R R Square Square the Estimate 
4 .699 .489 .445 56.29 
Coefficients 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
B Std. Error t Sig. 
(Constant) -21.38 223.83 -.10 .924 
Lagged 1 Q Unemployment Rate -11.56 9.71 -1.19 .240 All Persons 
Total GDHI (£ Billions) -26.50*** 7.17 -3.70 .001 
Political Beliefs Percent Other/ 13.59** 6.69 2.03 .048 Neither/Don't Know 
Percent Nationalist 8.02* 4.42 1.81 .076 
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Regression ModelS: Percent Unionist, Lagged One Year Unemployment Rate 
M diS o e ummary 
Model R 
5 .737 
Coefficients 
(Constant) 
R Square 
.543 
Lagged lYear Unemployment 
Rate All Persons 
Total GDHI (j, Billions) 
Political Beliefs Percent Other/ 
Neither/Don't Know 
Percent Unionist 
Adjusted R Std. Error of 
Square the Estimate 
.501 54.48 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
B Std. Error t Sig. 
739.58 236.12 3.13 .003 
-6.34 10.19 -.62 .536 
-28.50*** 7.09 -4.02 .000 
6.04 5.03 1.20 .236 
-6.98* 3.72 -1.88 .067 
Regression Model 6: Percent Nationalist, Lagged One Year Unemployment Rate 
M diS o e ummary 
Model R 
6 .725 
Coefficients 
(Constant) 
R Square 
.526 
Lagged lYear Unemployment 
Rate All Persons 
Total GDHI (j, Billions) 
Political Beliefs Percent Other/ 
Neither/Don't Know 
Percent Nationalist 
Adjusted R Std. Error of 
Square the Estimate 
.481 55.53 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
B Std. Error T Sig. 
111.40 229.98 .48 .631 
-6.77 10.40 -.65 .519 
-27.53*** 7.19 -3.83 .000 
11.69* 5.82 2.01 .051 
5.43 4.06 1.34 .187 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The results of this study have important implications for policymakers not only on the 
island of Ireland but also in other areas of intense ethnic conflict. The statistical insignificance of 
the unemployment rate on political violence may suggest that if the u.K. and Irish governments' 
priority is the reduction of violent activity, policies aimed at increasing household income would be 
more effective than efforts that specifically target lowering the unemployment rate. However, if 
further research indicates that persistent structural unemployment is related to political violence, this 
finding would strengthen the argument for government initiatives aimed at educating and training 
prospective workers. According to T.D. Joe McHugh, Chairman of the Joint Commitree on the 
Implementation of the Good Friday Agreement, current economic approaches to decreasing 
violence focus on funding grassroots programs combating youth unemployment. He stated in a 
press release this past September, "We are acutely aware that education and employment 
opportunities often elude many young people in Northern Ireland and the border region. As such, a 
focus on funding to assist in informal and formal education is to be welcomed."74 While the data 
fail to show any causal relationship between the unemployment rate and political violence, 
policymakers continue to act under the assumption that the two are related. Although a reduction in 
unemployment benefits society as a whole and is a worthwhile policy initiative, if both governments 
intend to reduce political violence, it would appear that an alternative approach would be more 
effective. 
One alternative would be shifting the focus to policies promoting the growth of individuals' 
household incomes. The strong negative correlation between GDHI and political violence provides 
empirical evidence for the link between economic wellbeing and the level of political violence. This 
in turn suggests that policies stressing economic development, particularly for communities, have 
the potential to lower the rates of violence. Policymakers could use this evidence as justification for 
their economic growth initiatives, which currently receive immense amounts of funding both from 
the U.K. and the EU. 
Notable among these initiatives is the EU Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in 
Northern Ireland and the Border Region of Ireland (the PEACE Programme). In the proposed 
2020 EU budget, €150 million was set aside to continue the PEACE Programme in addition to the 
€50 million already earmarked by the U.K." According to EU Commissioner for Regional Policy 
Johannes Hahn, the success of the PEACE Programme has already drawn the attention of Russia, 
Palestine, the Balkans, Colombia, and South Korea, countries that are seeking effective 
74 Oireachtas 2013 
75 Oireachtas 2013 
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reconciliation models.76 The evidence presented in this study suggests that such emulation has the 
potential to be highly effective in reducing politically motivated violence. This is a possibility that 
international economic organizations should consider when determining how to allocate 
development funds. 
As Northern Ireland continues to come to terms \vith its troubled past, preventing the 
resurgence of ethnic violence will continue to be of the utmost importance. In light of the empirical 
evidence of this study, there can be little doubt that the establishment of a solid economic 
foundation is critical to the maintenance of peace not only in this region but in other conflict areas 
as well. The need for the government to continue monitoring and promoting this stability should 
not be underestimated. Though Northern Ireland has undoubtedly made iucredible progress in the 
past fifteen years, the continued presence of paramilitary actors cautions agaiust the possibility of 
complacency on this matter. 
76 "Northern Ireland: The Peace Programme" 2013 
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MASS SHOOTINGS, MASS MEDIA, AND MASS OPINION: AN EXAMINATION OF 
HOW THE NEWS MEDIA AFFECTS PUBLIC OPINION IN THE AFTERMATH OF 
MASS SHOOTINGS 
Patrick Cavanaugh 
Abstract: This research looks at hom JJe)1Jspaper 1Jlmtiofls oj 1Jlass shootitlgs correlate Ivith the percmtage ojpeople ill 
tbe U.S. wbo vielv gUtl cOlltrol as the most jnportallt issllc facillg the C01lntry. While tbe agmda-setting iffoct oj the nellJs 
1Jledia bas bem tbeOtized and den/o11strated for a tllllllber oj differellt iSSlles, scbolars bave yet to c011sider bOlv tbe fUlJVS 
media 1JlCfY set tbe agmda for tbe pllblic's vie}]! 011 the i1Jlportance oj gUtl control tbrougb its coverage oj nlass sbootings. 
Utilii/1fg designs put flrtb 0 Smidt (2011), Tal1 and Weaver (2007), and Winter and Eyal (1984), tbis paper 
seeks to fill tbat gap 0 showillg tbe il/portance oj llCJVS 1Jledia disco/me sUlTOlmdittg 1Jlass ShOOtiltgS 011 public opinion 
formation. Wbile the results do 110t Sh01V a dqillite causal pattern betJveen higher I1eJVS media mentions oj a 1Jlass 
sbOOtiltg and a bigber percentage oj people Jvbo tbiNk gUl1 control is inportall� tbis stucfy does delJ/onstrate that there is 
an inportant relationship betJveel1 tlelVS 1Jledia disco/me and public opil1ion. 
INTRODUCTION 
A poll conducted by the Pew Research Center following the Newtown Shootings in December 2012 
found that public support for gun control increased in reaction to the tragedy. In the poll, 65 percent 
of respondents said that allowing citizens to own assault weapons makes the country more 
dangerous, 56 percent approved of legislation to ban bullets that could explode through bulletproof 
vests, and S3 percent supported measures to limit high-capacity ammunition clips.77 However, 
another article published by Pew Research Center in J uly of 2013 found that by May 2013 the spike 
in public suppOrt for gun control had receded to pre-Newton levels.78 This shift raises questions as 
to how much the mass shooting actually impacted public opinion, and how much outside sources 
influence that opinion. A possible source of influence is the news media, which has been theorized to 
have an agenda-setting effect on public opinion ever since Walter Lipmann's influential Public 
Opinion was published in 1922. 
In recent years, the gun control debate has often been framed by mass shootings. \X1hen a 
mass shooting gains traction in the media, the gun control debate is reignited, and politicians and 
special interest groups on both sides voice opinions on the appropriate course of action. Mass 
shootings appear to be followed by heated discourse on the extent to which gun control laws should 
be changed in response to the shooting. It would seem that mass shootings, defined by the FBI as 
public active shooter incidents wherein four or more people are killed within a short time span,79 
could bring gun control to the forefront of the public consciousness. 
However, an empirical study on whether coverage of mass shootings has any effect on the 
public's perception of the issue of gun control has yet to be done. Coverage of mass shootings has 
77 Pew Research Center 2012 
78 Pew Research Center 2013 
79 FBlgov 2005 
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been shown to impact perceptions on those with mental illness,80 and others have found that 
coverage of the 1999 Columbine shooting led to existing policies being more strictly followed and 
enforced,81 but none have performed a newspaper content analysis to determine the impact on public 
opinion. With easy access to news media outlets and public opinion polls on gun control, an 
opportunity exists to look at how mass shooting saliency impacts public perceptions. This study 
seeks to fill the research gap by asking the following: when mass shootings become salient in the 
news media, does the saliency of the story impact public opinion on the importance of gun control? 
And if it does, what types of coverage have greater impact? 
ORGAl'JIZING THE PUBLIC CONCIOUSNESS: THE NEWS MEDIA AS AGENDA SETTER 
Tbe01iifl1g tbe NeJvs Media as Pllblic Opinion Director 
Much has been written about the effect of the news media on public perceptions. Scholars 
have said that discourse in general, of which the news media plays a major part, influences the 
formation of public opinion.82 Discourse has long been thought to play an important role in 
informing the public's view on issues. It binds the social fabric of public opinion83 and is 
"indispensable to the organization of the public mind."84 Public opinion becomes coherent through 
the give and take of public discourse, in which ideas are debated, lines are drawn, and groups form 
together around issues that they deem important. Theoretical writings have posited that the news 
media's function in this discourse could be to influence public opinion by pointing readers' attention 
to certain stories. This is accomplished by giving more time to certain stories over others, or even, as 
Lippmann would say, through censorship.8s Put another way, news media outlets have the power to 
decide which information on a story is given and which information is withheld.86 Leading the 
public's attention to certain stories, according to Lippmann, organizes public opinion along the lines 
of what the news media views as important: " ... the newspapers necessarily and inevitably 
reflect ... organization of public opinion."87 Though Lippmann failed to reinforce this assertion with 
empirical data, he provided detailed theoretical and analytical insights into the power of the news 
media to impact public opinion. 
Later theoretical writings on the news media's influence on public opinion focused 
Lippmann's broad claims in more nuanced ways. Scholars made an important distinction in how 
exactly the news media's influence functions, characterizing it less as a factor that changes public 
80 McGinty, Webster, and Berry 2013 
Bl Birkland and Lawrence 2009 
82 Blumer 1946, 48 
63 Park 1939 
84 Cooley 1909, 149 
85 Lippmann 1922, 76 
86 Berelson 1948 
87 Lippmann 1922, 32 
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opinion and more as an "agenda-setter" for what issues that public should be thinking of and having 
opinions about. Cohen (1963) said it best: "[The press] may not be successful much of the time in 
telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think 
about."88 Kurt and Gladys Engel Lang (1966) echoed Cohen's assertion, offering that the mass media 
directs public attention by "suggesting what individuals in the mass should think about, know about, 
have feelings about."89 Though these claims are similar to Lippmann's characterization of the news 
media as opinion organizer, Lippmann also asserted that the news media "intensified" public 
opinion, which these scholars argue against.90 The news media acts less as an opinion changer and 
more as an opinion director, pointing its figurative finger toward the issues on which the public 
should be keeping its collective eye. 
To some scholars, the news media's attention-directing function in tandem with its constant 
movement between stories creates a perpetual cycle of rising and falling interest. As the news media's 
attention to an issue decreases, a new issue takes its place. Anthony Downs has dubbed this 
phenomenon the "issue attention cycle."91 Scholars have shown that the news media not only directs 
the public's attention to certain issues, but also contributes to the cycle of increasing and decreasing 
public valuing of issues. 92 Ultimately, the news media has been characterized not as an opinion 
changer, but as an agenda-setter, a factor in determining what issues the public thinks and cares 
about. 
Conjil7Jlatiotl rif the Agenda-S efttiIg Process atld Illumination rif hOJJI it FlttlctiotlS 
Many scholars have run various types of studies to observe the different ways that news 
media sets the public opinion agenda, though few have focused specifically on the issue of gun 
control. McCombs and Shaw (1972), employing survey data, found that "voters tend to share the 
media's composite definition of what is important," which they thought "strongly suggest[ed] an 
agenda-setting function of the mass media."93 This study was subject to some limitations. For one, it 
focused more on voters and less on the public as a whole, and it may not be possible to generalize 
from voters, who are more likely to be informed, to the public as a whole. Additionally, McCombs 
and Shaw acknowledged that it did not necessarily prove the agenda-setting function, as the 
correlation between the news media's mention of political players and the measure of voters' political 
interest in them could be a result of the news media accurately predicting what the public might want 
88 Cohen 1963, 13 
89 Lang and Lang 1966, 468 
90 Ibid. 
91 Downs 1972 
92 Protess et. a1 1987; Cook and Skogan 1990 
93 McCombs and Shaw 1972, 184 
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to hear94. Despite these drawbacks, the study still provided an early look at how the agenda-setting 
function might be empirically tested. 
Many other studies have since been completed on the agenda-setting function of the news 
media. Scholars have found that news media agenda-setting can influence the speed at which 
policymaking takes place, while others have discovered that it can reinforce political interest in the 
public.95 Tan and Weaver (2007) used NeJV York Times coverage of events from 1946 to 2004 
correlated with Gallup's Most Important Problem question to take a long-form perspective on the 
agenda-setting function of the media. In general, they found a positive correlation between media 
coverage and public opinion, suggesting that the public viewed salient issues as the more important 
ones.% However, this year-by-year approach takes a broad look at broad issues, whereas a monthly 
look at the media mentions and the Mostlmportant Problem question applied to a specific issue may 
be more useful to demonstrating the particulars of agenda-setting. 
To engage in this month-by-month analysis of agenda-setting, Winter and Eyal's (1981) 
findings in their study on agenda-setting in the Civil Rights Issue will be helpful. In that study, 
mentions from the NeJv York Times were correlated with Gallup polls on a monthly basis. In addition 
to finding a strong correlation between the two, the scholars discovered that a time-lag is necessary 
when testing for agenda-setting. Analyzing content from one month prior to a poll, they discovered, 
leads to stronger correlations, suggesting that it takes about four to six weeks for the public to adopt 
the agenda set by the news media.97 Consequently, when determining how mass shooting coverage 
may impact the public's perception of gun control, it would be useful to employ a similar time-lag. 
Though the agenda-setting effect has been confirmed in many instances, some studies have shown 
that it is not enough for the news media to mention an issue - how the news media covers the issue 
can influence agenda-setting. One study found that gun control coverage focusing on citizen activists 
groups may have greater influence on public opinion than coverage of the efforts of politicians, 
meaning the angle of coverage can influence agenda-setting effects.98 Medium matters as well, with 
internet stories shown as more likely to spur political interest than other forms of news media.99 The 
takeaway from these studies is that counting mentions is not enough when analyzing the agenda­
setting effect; studies must acknowledge that differing angles can influence how important the public 
views an issue to be. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Wolfe 2012; Boulianne 2011 
96 Tan and Weaver 2007, 735 
97 Winter and Eya11981, 381 
98 Smidt 2011 
99 Boulianne 2011 
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HYPOTHESES 
A number of testable hypotheses arise from the literature and the study at hand. The primary 
hypothesis states the following: 
H1: The more mentions that appear of a mass shooting in the New York Times, the 
Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times, the USA Todqy, and the Cbicago Tribllne , the 
higher the percentage of people who think gun control is the most important 
problem facing the United States will be in the month following the coverage. 
This hypothesis operates under the theory that news media organize, direct, and have a role in 
leading public opinion. According to this theory, as news media cover mass shootings, issues of gun 
control become more salient in the public consciousness. The increased awareness of mass shootings 
and gun control issues then leads the public to value gun control more, to see it as a more important 
issue. Though more on this will be covered in the "Design and Methodology" section, it is important 
to note that the hypothesis specifically mentions the public opinion in the month after the shooting 
as a result of taking Winter and Eyal's time-lag into consideration. 
In line with Smidt and others, a number of hypotheses about the differing angles of mass 
shooting coverage follow from the primary hypothesis. Not only will this study test the agenda­
setting effect of total mentions in these newspapers, it will also test how differing frames influence 
agenda-setting. The hypotheses in the table below account for the possibility that different frames on 
maSs shootings will influence how the news media's agenda-setting works (if it is there to begin with). 
Each frame is predicted to have a positive correlation with public opinion on the importance of gun 
control because if it is true that total mentions correlate positively with public opinion (Hl), then it 
would follow that each frame would also correlate positively (H2-H7). It would not make sense if 
one of the frames had a negative correlation when the frames in total correlate. It would not make 
sense if one of the frames had a negative correlation when the frames in total correlate positively 
since the frames are just subsets of total mentions. 
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Table 1: Hypotheses 
HZ: The more articles that appear in the aforementioned newspapers that take a "gun legislation" 
frame to mass shootings, the higher the percentage of people who think gun control is the most 
important problem facing the United States will be in the month following the shooting. 
\9 H2a: This frame will show a stronger correlation with public opinion than all other tested 
frames. 
H3: The more articles that appear in the aforementioned newspapers that take a "mental illness" 
frame to mass shootings, the higher the percentage of people who think gun control is the most 
important problem facing the United States will be in the month following the shooting. 
\9 H3a: This frame will show a stronger correlation with public opinion than all other tested 
frames except for "gun legislation." 
H4: The more articles that appear in the aforementioned newspapers that take a "shooter profile" 
frame to mass shootings, the higher the percentage of people who think gun control is the most 
important problem facing the United States will be in the month following the shooting. 
• H4a: This frame will show a stronger correlation with public opinion than all other tested 
frames except for "gun legislation" and "mental illness." 
H5: The more articles that appear in the aforementioned newspapers that take a "victim profile" 
frame to mass shootings, the higher the percentage of people who think gun control is the most 
important problem facing the United States will be in the month following the shooting. 
• H5a: This frame will show a stronger correlation with public opinion than "changing 
security" and "general mentions," but a weaker one than all other tested frames. 
H6: The more articles that appear in the aforementioned newspapers that take a "changing 
security" frame to mass shootings, the higher the percentage of people who think gun control is 
the most important problem facing the United States will be in the month following the shooting. 
• H6a: This frame will show a stronger correlation with public opinion than "general 
mentions," but a weaker one than all other tested frames. 
H7: The more articles with general mentions of mass shootings that appear in the aforementioned 
newspapers, the higher the percentage of people who think gun control is the most important 
problem facing the United States will be in the month following the shooting. 
«I H7a: This frame will show a weaker correlation with public opinion than all other frames 
However, the frames are predicted to have varying levels of strength of correlation. News 
articles that frame mass shootings in reference to the issue of gun control, whether directly or 
indirectly, are predicted to have higher correlations. The "gun legislation" (GL) frame is predicted to 
have the strongest correlation because it direcdy references the issue of gun control. Theoretically, a 
high volume of articles that frame a mass shooting in relation to gun control will more overtly direct 
reader attention to the issue of gun control than other frames, fostering public awareness of the 
problem and leading the public to view it as more important. The "mental illness" (MI) frame is 
predicted to have the second strongest correlation because it references an important sub-issue of 
gun control. While they do not reference the issue direcdy like the GL frame, articles that follow the 
MI frame will still lead the public to see the gun control issue as more important. 
Those frames that look at the human aspect of the mass shootings are predicted to have 
weaker correlations than those that reference the issue, but stronger correlation than those that 
examine issues largely unrelated to gun control. The "shooter pro me" (SH) frame is predicted to 
have the third strongest correlation among all of the frames. While it does not direcdy reference gun 
control in relation to a mass shooting, it does reference a reason some people may support gun 
control: limiting access to guns to certain citizens. Consequently, it may bring gun control to the fore 
of the public consciousness more than other indirecdy related frames. The "victim prome" (V) is 
predicted to have the fourth strongest correlation because articles that take that angle reference a 
possible consequence of gun control policies without necessarily bringing up the issue of gun 
control. Articles that use the V frame may lead the public to think about gun control, but they also 
may elicit emotional responses that do not necessarily raise public cognizance of gun control. 
Those frames that either reference different issues or no issues at all are predicted to have 
the least strong correlations. The "changing security" frame (CS) is predicted to have the fifth 
strongest correlation because it directs reader attention to a divergent issue: alterations to institutional 
protections against violence, such as police or warning systems. As a result, it would follow that this 
frame would theoretically lead the public to become more aware of different issues than gun control 
and value those problems more. Finally, the "general mentions" frame (G) is predicted to have the 
weakest correlation because those articles do not reference any issues of gun control or security. The 
G frame refers to all articles that cursorily mention a mass shooting in the context of the article's 
larger focus. 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
To test these hypotheses, I ran a series of bivariate correlations between media mentions of a 
mass shooting in one month and the percentage of people who say gun control is the most important 
problem facing the country in the following month. Data collection consisted of two main parts: 
media content analysis (counting and coding of mentions) and public opinion poll collection. My 
independent variable is then newspaper mentions of mass shootings, and my dependent variable is 
public opinion on how important of a problem people perceive gun control to be. 
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The media content analysis focused on six mass shootings, here listed in chronological order: 
the Red Lake Massacre (2005), the Virginia Tech Massacre (2007), the Binghamton Shootings (2009), 
the Fort Hood Shootings (2009), the Aurora Colorado Theater Massacre (2012), and the Newtown 
School Massacre (2012). These shootings were chosen because they were the six most deadly public 
mass shootings in the past 10 years (excluding the recent Washington Naval Yard Shooting, which 
was too recent to analyze using this model), meaning they would be more likely to gain media 
traction. lOa 
For each mass shooting, the number of instances the Nelv Y01:k Times, the WasbillgtotJ Post, the 
Los Atlgeles Ti",es, the USA Todqy, and The Chicago Tribune ran articles on or mentioned the mass 
shooting in the month follm.ving were counted. Each article was coded as either GL, MI, SH, V, CS, 
or G. The total mentions from all five of. the papers were then grouped by month, as were the coded 
mentions. In instances where newspaper mentions of the mass shootings overlapped, the mention 
data were grouped together since the unit of analysis is broadly "mass shooting newspaper mentions 
per month," with a total of 57 months. 
These newspapers were chosen because they represent a variety of regions in the country, 
are all national papers, and have large circulation.lol By covering a wide variety of regions and using 
widely circulated papers, the hope was the newspaper mention counts could be generalized to 
represent the country's public consciousness as a whole and that they would represent readership 
across the United States. Coding for each of the aforementioned frames utilized the following 
guidelines: 
100 Mother Jones 2013 
101 Alliance for Audited Media 2013 
Frame 
GL 
MI 
SH 
V 
CS 
G 
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Table 2: Article Coding Guidelines 
Definition 
Discusses a mass shooting from 
the angle of implementing or 
altering gun control legislation, 
arguments for or against gun 
control, etc. 
Discusses a mass shooting from 
the angle of mental stability, 
new approaches to mental 
health, altering illness in regards 
to mental illness and guns, etc. 
Discusses a mass shooting from 
the angle of profiling the 
shooter, explaining his 
motivations, detailing his 
personal history or family life, 
etc. 
Discusses a mass shooting from 
the angle of the victims' 
backgrounds, providing 
eulogies, detailing memorial 
plans, etc. 
Discusses a mass shooting from 
the angle of changing or 
enhancing security to prevent 
future shootings, any security 
pitfalls in regards to the 
shooting, etc. 
Any general mention of a 
shooting in articles not 
primarily about the shooting. 
Example 
"Gun control groups said that they admired the efforts, 
but that they would never carry the weight of 
legislation to expand the number of gun buyers who 
are subjected to the background check system ... " 
- 'White House Makes Moves to Bolster Gun 
Safety" Nel}} York Times, 6/12/13 
"According to a research review published this year in 
Annals of General Psychiatry, most people with 
Asperger's who commit violent crimes have serious, 
often undiagnosed mental problems ... " 
- "Predicting Who's at Risk for Violence Isn't 
Easy" USA Todqy, 12/22/12 
"She thought Cho Seung Hui exuded loneliness, and 
she volunteered to teach him by herself, to spare her 
colleagues ... " 
- "Student Wrote About Death and Spoke in 
Whispers, But No One Imagined What Cho 
Seung Hui Would Do" Washington Post J 
4/18/07 
"Roberta King was ... as passionate about helping 
others as she was about teaching." 
- "Victim of Binghamton Shootings Is 
Remembered for Her Compassion" Net}} York 
Times, 4/5/2009 
The military remains vulnerable to another Fort Hood­
like massacre with religious radicalization on the rise 
and too little attention being paid to internal threats, 
Pentagon officials said Friday ... " 
- "Port Hood Report Critical of Officers" 
Chicago TributJe, 1/16/2010 
"Yes, they have thoughts on Aurora. Yes, gun violence 
affects these gold medalists. Yes, mass shootings will 
always impact the sport . . .  " 
- "Even at the Olympks, Athletes in the Sport 
of Shooting Pace Questions about Gun 
Violence" Washington Post, 7/31/2012 
Public opinion data were collected from Gallup.com. The monthly question of the most 
important problem facing the United States was used to gauge how important people found the issue 
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of gun control to be. The exact wording of the question is ''What do you think is the most important 
problem facing this country today?" It is an open-ended question in which respondents can answer 
whatever they like. Gallup pollsters then code each response according to a set of categories, one of 
which gun control. Gallup poll data were collected for the month after the coverage to account for 
Winter and EyaYs time lag theory. Since the most important problem question is from a national 
polling source, it may be used to reflect national perceptions on the importance of gun control. 
Once both the newspaper counts were complete for each month in the year, the total 
mentions of a mass shooting in each month were correlated with public opinion on the importance 
of gun control in the following month. A one-tailed correlation was used to test for direction and 
strength of correlation. Direction here is important because the research is trying to determine 
whether increased mentions of mass shootings influence increased public belief in gun control's 
importance. Further, each of the coded mentions, grouped as "mentions per month," were also 
correlated with public opinion in order to see which types of mentions had stronger correlations with 
public opinion. Again, these were one-tailed correlations, testing for the strength and direction of 
correlation. 
Two additional sets of correlations were also run to test for causality. Whereas the initial 
correlations tested the strength and direction of the relationship between mentions/ coded mentions 
at time zero (l'vho) and public opinion one month later (MTO+l), the next set of correlations tested the 
relationship between mentions/coded mentions and public opinion in the same month, or both at 
MTO. Further, the last set of correlations tested the relationship between mentions/ coded mentions at 
MTO and public opinion in the previous month (MTO-l). If the causal pattern flows from media 
mentions at MTO to public opinion at MTO+1, the relationship between mentions/coded mentions and 
public opinion both taken at MTO should be weaker than the one found at MTo and MTO+l. If the 
relationship between mentions/coded mentions and public opinion at lVho and MTO-1 were found to 
be more strongly positive than the relationship between mentions/coded mentions and public 
opinion at MTO and MTO+l, this would suggest the inverse of this study's proposed hypothesis. 
Ultimately, using this model, it will be possible to test the direction and strength of the relationship 
between mentions/coded mentions to determine if media mentions of mass shootings influence 
public opinion on the importance of gun control, and whether this causality flows in the direction 
this study would expect_ 
DATA 
Table 3 provides the correlation between total mentions of mass shootings per month and 
the percentage of people who answered that gun control was the most important problem facing the 
country in the Gallup polls. Correlations are shown for MTO, MTO+J, and MTO-l . 
RES PUB LIe A J '37 
Table 3: Total Mass Shooting Mentions and Public Opinion on the Importance of Gun Control 
Total Mentions Gun Control Gun Control Gun Control 
Importance MTO+I Importance MTO Importance MTO-I 
Pearson Correlation .658** .573** .339** 
Sig. (i-tailed) .000 .000 .005 
N 57 57 57 
Note: **. Correlatlon IS slgruficant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). 
Table 4 presents a correlation matrix of the total coded mentions grouped by month. These 
coded mentions were correlated with MTO, MTO+1, and MTO-l in order to test hypotheses two through 
seven. 
Table 4: Correlations between Coded Mentions of Mass Shootings and the Public's Opinion on the 
Importance of Gun Control 
Gun Control 
Importance MTO+l 
GL Pearson Correlation .832** 
Sig. (i-tailed) .000 
MI Pearson Correlation .613** 
Sig. (i-tailed) .000 
SH Pearson Correlation .188 
Sig. (i-tailed) .081 
V Pearson Correlation .351 ** 
Sig. (i-tailed) .004 
CS Pearson Correlation .604** 
Sig. (i-tailed) .000 
G Pearson Correlation .633** 
Sig. (i-tailed) .000 
Note: N=57 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (I-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (l-tailed). 
Gun Control 
Importance MTO 
.704** 
.000 
.595** 
.000 
. 133 
. 162 
.272* 
.020 
.500** 
.000 
.582** 
.000 
DISCUSSION 
Total Mentions Correlated With Public Opi11ion 
Gun Control 
Importance MTO-l 
_533** 
.000 
.451** 
.000 
.042 
.379 
. 107 
.215 
.463** 
.000 
.280* 
.017 
Analyzing the correlations conducted in the study provides more evidence for the influence 
of newspaper mentions of mass shootings on public perceptions of gun control. The relationship 
between total mentions of a mass shooting in the five newspapers grouped by mentions per month 
and the percentage of the public that viewed gun control as the most important problem in the 
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following month was positive and statistically significant. The Pearson's Correlation Coefficient was 
.658, which was statistically significant at the .001 level. This strongly suggests that as newspaper 
mentions of a mass shooting increase, so does the public's view on the importance of a problem gun 
control is; this result is extremely unlikely to have been found by chance. 
The flow of causality is uncertain, though. The subsequent correlations done when public 
opinion is at MTO and MTO·l are weaker than the correlation done at MTO+l, but they are both still 
fairly strong and significant at the .01 level. Winter and Eyal's (1981) estimated that it takes 4 to 6 
weeks, or about one month, for the news media's influence to take effect on public opinion. 
However, one would expect the relationship to dissolve when correlating opinion at MTO.l and 
newspaper mentions at MTO because this would assume that public opinion shifts before the mass 
shooting occurs. 
The fact that the relationship is still positive and statistically significant when the time lag is 
removed might indicate that public opinion may also influence how much the news media covers 
mass shootings. Influence between public opinion and newspaper coverage could be a two way 
street. Although, this correlation is weaker than the other two, it is possible that this positive 
relationship could indicate the presence of an intervening variable influencing both public opinion 
and the number of newspaper mentions. Therefore, while the initial correlation appeared to confirm 
the primary hypothesis, the direction of causality is not entirely clear. This study suggests not only 
that newspaper mentions of maSs shootings play a role in setting the agenda for public opinion On 
the importance of gun control, but that public mood many influence what the news covers. 
Coded Mentions Comlated JJlitb Public Opinion 
When breaking the total mentions down into coded mentions, there is a noticeable variation 
in the correlation between newspaper coverage in MTO and public opinion on the importance of gun 
control in MTO+l. As predicted in H2, the "gun legislation" (GL) frame easily had the strongest 
correlation, with a Pearson's Correlation Coefficient of .832, statistically significant at the .001 level. 
As hypothesized, articles that focus on gun legislation have a stronger relationship with public 
opinion in the month following the coverage than all other frames. 
Monthly groupings of articles coded for the "mental illness" (MI) frame were not as strongly 
correlated with public opinion as was predicted in H3, but still had a strong, positive, statistically 
significant relationship with public opinion on the importance of gun control. The Pearson's 
Correlation Coefficient of .613, significant at the .001 level, made articles using the MI frame the 
third most influential frame of the six studied. This means that, contrary to expectations, articles that 
reference the mental illness subtopic of gun control in regard to mass shootings are not the second 
most influential at leading public opinion on gun control, though they may still be very influential in 
framing gun control perceptions. 
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Contrary to H4's prediction that the "shooter profIle" (SH) would be the third strongest, 
monthly groupings of articles coded for the SH frame turned out to have no statistically significant 
relationship with attitudes on gun control. In fact, it was the only frame that had no statistically 
significant relationship with public opinion. As such, the SH frame appears to be unimportant in 
setting the agenda on public views on gun control. 
The monthly groupings of articles coded for the "victim profIle" M frame also did not fall 
in their expected correlation strength ranking. Though H5 predicted the frame would be the fourth 
strongest correlation of all the frames, it instead turned out to be the weakest among those that had a 
statistically significant correlation. The correlation between groupings of articles employing the V 
frame had a Pearson's Correlation Coefficient of .351, statistically significant at the .01 level. While 
the V frame is not as useful for predicting how important gun control is to the public as the other 
statistically significant frames, it still may have some use in setting the agenda for public opinion on 
gun control. 
Monthly groupings of articles taking the "changing security" (CS) frame correlated more 
strongly than expected with public opinion in the month following the shooting. H6 predicted that 
articles employing a CS angle to mass shootings would have a weaker relationship than all frames 
except the G frame, but the correlations showed that those articles have the fourth strongest 
correlation of all the frames, with a Pearson' Correlation Coefficient of .604 statistically significant at 
the .01 level. This correlation coefficient was almost as strong as the MI frame. Consequently, this 
shows that the CS frame may have a connection with higher percentages of people viewing gun 
control as a more important issue, regardless of whether CS articles reference gun control directly. It 
appears that merely reference changing rules of any sort in terms of mass shootings may impact how 
important people view gun control to be. 
The monthly groupings of the "general mention" (G) frame, which were predicted in H7 to 
have the weakest correlation, are shown in this study to have the second strongest correlation. 
Groupings of the G frame at MTO were correlated with the percentage of people who view gun 
control as important at MTO+! with a coefficient of .633, statistically significant at the .01 level. This 
means that, even though general mentions appear in cursorily related articles, just mentioning a mass 
shooting frequently may raise public awareness enough to lead the public to view gun control as 
more important. Contrary to the prediction H7, this research shows that the G frame has the second 
strongest correlation, making 1t a more useful predictor for public opinion on the importance of gun 
control. The flnal strength-ranking for the frames was then: GL > G > MI > CS > V > SH. 
Again, causality is not entirely clear in each of these correlations, as public opinion at MTO.! 
also has a strong, positive, statistically significant relationship with GL, MI, CS, and G articles 
grouped at MTO. Newspaper coverage may not set the agenda for public opinion completely; it may 
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be influenced by the public as well. When a higher percentage of the public views gun control as 
important, the news media may respond by focusing more attention on related stories, like mass 
shootings. While the majority of these frames, excluding SH, demonstrate that these newspapers may 
play an agenda-setting role for public opinion, the many positive, statistically significant relationships 
between mentions at MTO and public opinion at MTO-l indicates that the public's valuing of gun 
control may lead what newspapers cover as well. In fact, it is even possible that the news media and 
public opinion could be locked in its own cycle. \X'hen public opinion views gun control as more 
important, news sources could be more likely to cover mass shootings, which could then make the 
public more likely to vie\v gun control as an important issue, etc. However, this question is outside 
the scope of this study. 
CONCLUSION 
There are some obvious drawbacks to this study, primarily that correlations cannot 
demonstrate true causality. However, the statistically significant correlations suggest there is a 
powerful relationship between the two, and that the news may have an agenda-setting effect in its 
coverage of mass shootings, similar to previous studies mentioned in the literature. Additionally, it is 
possible that the newspapers used for this study are not as generalizable as one would assume, 
though that seems unlikely since they are all large, national, widely circulated newspapers (both online 
and in print) that tap into and reflect the public consciousness. 
A larger drawback of this analysis is found in the Gallup Poll Most Important Problem 
Question results. There are many instances where the percentage of people who respond that gun 
control is the most important problem facing the nation is a tenth of a percent, half of a percent, or 
some other fraction of a percent. Consequently, those instances where the percentage of people who 
respond to the question with "gun control" reaches 6 percent seem very large by comparison. While 
the study showed newspaper mentions in MTO to have strong, positive, and statistically significant 
correlations with public opinion at MTO+l, the substantive significance of the results is lacking. An 
increase in newspaper mentions of a mass shooting may relate to the public viewing gun control as a 
more important issue, but whatever influence increased mentions has may only alter public opinion 
by a fe\v tenths of a percent. Newspaper coverage may have a statistically significant relationship with 
public opinion in this instance, but it may not impact it all that much. 
What this study does show, however, is that discourse surrounding mass shootings has a 
relationship with the public vie\ving gun control as more important_ Even if more media mentions do 
not correlate \vith drastic alterations in public opinion, the statistical significance of the correlations 
suggests that news media mentions of mass shootings should not be discounted as part of public 
opinion formation on the importance of gun control. This study also demonstrates that it is not just 
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general news discourse that matters; the manner in which the news media covers mass shootings 
changes the relationship. 
Further, this study showed that mass shooting mentions in a month have a stronger 
correlation with opinion in the month following these media mentions. But public opinion may still 
have some impact on what newspapers decide to cover. Future studies might look more extensively 
at how public opinion may lead news media mentions, or to see if there is an interacting variable that 
influences both newspaper mentions of a mass shooting and public opinion on the importance of 
gun control, such as discourse from interest groups or politicians. 
The lack of these considerations in this study should not detract from what was found. This 
study shows that newspaper discourse on mass shootings has a statistically significant relationship 
with public opinion on the importance of gun control, meaning it should be an important 
consideration when thinking of how public opinion on gun control is formed. Moreover, this study 
showed that how mass shootings are covered is important in determining the strength of that 
relationship. This study, by demonstrating the importance of the relationship between news 
discourse on mass shootings and public opinion on the importance of gun control, opens up 
possibilities for future studies on the formation of public opinion in regards to gun control and mass 
shootings. The results of this research show that news discourse on mass shootings, as Cooley (1909) 
said, may be crucial to the organization of the public mind. 
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THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE DARK HORSE IN AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY 
Lexi Baltes 
Abstract: Tbis research examilles the extent to Ivhich the Supreme Court bas the pOlver to influence public opinion. 
There is a good deal of consensus in the literature regarding the influence of public opinion on the Supreme Cotll1. 
HOIVever, a relatively small pool of contradictory research attempting to tum the casual armv jivm the Court to the 
public tlJJdersc01�s the fact that tbe question oftvhether or 1I0t a t/ynamic, back-andforth relationship exists is still open 
for debate. Usitl!! a p011ion of the Ivork done by Erikson, MacKtlCn and Stimson itt The Macro Polity (2002) as a 
mode� and relyill!! heavily on James Stimson's public mood data and salient Supreme COtilt decisions fronl 1969-
2008, this stllt/y asserts that the Supreme COUlt has the pOIVer to influence the public mood on salient ismes, especially 
Ivith regard to highly unanimous decisions. Consequently, this stut/y suggests a dialogue exists behveen hvo grotrps that 
}vere never intended to speak. 
INTRODUCTION 
Public opinion carries great weight in the American form of democratic government. A 
government by the people and for the people implies the certainty of a back-and-fortb dialogue 
between public preferences and institutional accommodations. In order to ensure the government 
acts faithfully, certain restraints are in place-namely, electoral accountability and legitimacy through 
acceptance. In this way, the public controls the thermostat, choosing the ideological temperature of 
the policy produced, enforced, and allowed to stand.10' 
The public has tremendous power and influence over the governing of the nation, yet it is 
well documented that, at least at the individual level, the public is not well informed about political 
issues.'03 But how, and how effectively, is the public calling the shots for a global superpower? John 
Zaller (1992) and James Stimson (1991; 1994) explain that by relying on elite influence (politicians, 
public officials, etc.) and other heuristics, the public manages to make rational decisions and control 
the ideological thermostat in a systematic and predictable way. Public opinion is tied to governmental 
action and positions. However,Jacobs and Shapiro are adamant about the diminishing 
responsiveness to public opinion. They believe that politicians use the measurement of public 
opinion "not to move their positions closer to the public's (as commonly assumed) but just the 
opposite-to find the most effective means to move public opinion closer to their own desired 
policies."104 
This is a dangerous proposition for any branch of government, but what of the "least 
dangerous branch," the branch theoretically isolated from the passions of the public and the passing 
partisan tides? The interaction between the Supreme Court and public opinion may be both the most 
interesting and least studied relationship for largely the same reason: it is the forbidden fruit of 
government and politics, the relationship that was never supposed to be. However, in order to 
102 Erikson, MacKuen, S timson 2002; Deutsch 1963; Easton 1953; Wlezien 1995 
103 e.g. Converse 1962 
104 J acobs & S hapiro 2002, p. 5 5  
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understand politics today, the question must be asked: to what extent do Supreme Court decisions 
have the power to influence public opinion and mood? There is a significant compilation of 
scholarship suggesting the presence of the relationship between public opinion and its influence on 
Supreme Court decisions, but not much more than defensive, nervous rhetoric regarding the reversal 
of the causal arrow. This research, relying heavily on Stimson's public mood data and salient 
Supreme Court decisions between 1969 and 2008, seeks to shed light on the extent to which the 
"least dangerous branch" can influence the public at a level as fundamental as mood and opinion, 
and investigate the implications the results have on the balance of power. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Over 50 years ago, Robert Dahl sparked interest in the Supreme Court's political presence. 
He wrote, "As a political institution, the Court is highly unusual, not least because Americans are not 
quite willing to accept the fact that it is a political institution and not quite capable of denying it," and 
yet, "much of the legitimacy of the Court's decisions rest upon the fiction that it is not a political 
institution but exclusively a legal one," (1957). The idea that the nation has turned a blind eye to the 
incongruous attributes it associates with the Court only becomes clearer as partisan divide places 
increasing credence on ideological position of issues and policy. 
There is a good deal of consensus in the literature regarding the influence of public opinion 
on the Supreme Court.105 Theory would suggest, in these more polarized times, this influence would 
weaken or fade completely as Justices become more fixated upon an ideological stance regardless of 
external influences. Nevertheless, in a relatively recent study of cases from 1953-1996, McGuire and 
Stimson (2004) found that the Supreme Court continues to weigh their decisions against public 
mood so as to issue decisions that have a chance of being enforced. 
These findings are reminiscent of Dahl's influential propositions and an ample amount of 
legitimacy hypothesis scholarship since then.'OG Recent scholarship suggests that public mood, even 
after controlling for the "social forces" that influence both public and judicial mood, influences 
constitutional interpretations espoused in Supreme Court decisions.'07 At the very least, this points to 
the weighed and measured constraint placed on the Court based on its own forethought and self­
preservation. Like other politicians, Supreme Court Justices seem to have a perception of the most 
expedient position.IOB There is an established pattern of acknowledgement of, and respect for, public 
mood in the decisions of the Supreme Court. 
105 J\rIcGuire & Stimson 2004; Casillas, Enns, Wohlfarth 2010; Erikson, Stimson, MacKeun 2002 
106 Mondak 1992; Baas & Thomas 1984; Jaros & Roper 1980; Murphy & Tanenhous 1968; Marshall 1987; 
Johnson & Martin 1998 
107 Casillas, Enns, & Wohlfarth 2010 
108 Stimson, rvIacKuen & Erikson 1995 
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The presence of a unified voice from scholars regarding the existence of a relationship 
running from public mood to Supreme Court decisions cannot be overstated when theorizing about 
reverse causation. If the legitimacy of Supreme Court decisions depend, at least in part, on public 
acceptance, then it follows that the Court would actively try to pull public opinion toward its 
preferences. The idea of figuratively purchasing stability public opinion finds wide support among 
scholars of the Supreme Court.I09 Referenced many ways throughout the literature, the term 
"judicial capital" will hereby be used to indicate the "funds" used by the Supreme Court. The theory 
maintains that the Court can use its judicial capital to purchase the legitimacy of a decision, but at 
some point it will run out of capital and have to start saving again. This research is less interested in 
determining the way in which the Court gains, spends, and otherwise uses this capital than it is with 
advancing the notion that when purchasing legitimacy, the Court might also be purchasing public 
opinion. The idea of judicial capital is a foundational theoretical justification that functions to situate 
and legitimize this study within the larger body of literature. 
Turning to the relatively small pool of research that looks at the influence of Supreme Court 
decision on public opinion, it becomes clear that the question of whether or not a dynamic, or 
biconditional, relationship between the Court and the public exists is still open for debate. Much of 
the current literature concludes evidence is lacking to indicate any such relationship exists.1l0 
However, there are flaws in both theory and design throughout this camp of research. 
In one of the more prominent studies, Marshall (1987) finds that but for a small collection of 
cases, Supreme Court decisions have virtually no effect on public opinion. He looks at the influence 
of just eighteen cases using pre- and post-decision opinion poll data. The statistical limitations of 
such a design go without saying, but what is more, the eighteen Court decisions used were from 
varying issue domains. It is important to note that when researching the impact of Supreme Court 
decisions it is difficult to justify looking at individual cases. It is well known that "(policy) is highly 
cumulative, the result of a stream of decisions over cime."lll, The Court rarely rules singularly or 
finally on any issue, and even when it does, its decision is still taken in concert with decisions on 
other issues. Therefore, it is flawed to look at certain isolated hiccups in the Court's discourse and 
far better to analyze its influence in light of the fluid voice espoused in a collection of decisions. 
Other studies stop shott of actually investigating the influence of the Supreme Court on public 
opinion because they conclude that people know too little to be able to systematically respond to 
J09 Casillas et. a1. 2010; McGuire & Stimson 2004; Hetherington & Smith 2007; Mondak 1992; Caldeira & 
Gibson 1992 
lID Blake 1977; Marshall 1987; Baas & Thomas 1984; Jaros & Roper 1980; Murphy & Tanenhous 1968; 
Hetherington & S mith 2007 
1 1 1  Erikson ct. aL 2002 
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Supreme Court decisions.112 People generally lack political information and the motivation necessary 
to process and correctly align themselves with ideological positions taken in Court opinions.l13 
Therefore, these researchers conclude there is no reason to look further. This study is much less 
concerned with knowledge and explicit awareness of Court decisions, but instead asserts that 
awareness is not a requirement for potential influence. To believe otherwise is to discount ample 
research in the way of heuristics besides knowledge that have been confidently considered to aid the 
formation of "appropriate" public opinions, and ignore the reality that public mood may be an 
airborne \r1rUS catchable absent direct contact. 
Those finding a significant influence of Supreme Court decisions on public opinion 114 are 
relatively few in number and possess their own theoretical and logistical shortcomings. Mondak 
(1992) finds that the Court can increase support for rulings, but at a price. This is consistent with the 
judicial capital theory. However, it would seem that when measuring influence of the Court, analysis 
ought not be limited to support for the decision, but perhaps better focused on ensuing change of 
opinion, especially opinion on the issues about which the decision was determined. Furthermore, 
Mondak's conclusions are drawn from a controlled experiment that utilizes hypothetical policy and 
rulings, which exacerbates the limitations of the research. 
Taking a unique approach, Franklin and Kosaki (1989) also find that the Supreme Court 
influences public opinion. However, they do not measure influence in terms of increased support 
for the Court's position on an issue. Instead, they measure the structural change of groups 
supporting certain issue positions, finding that Supreme Court decisions lead to greater homogeneity 
and clearer preferences between groups (1989). Though Franklin and Kosaki view this structural 
change as the dichotomous alternative to increased support, in reality, it neither helps nor hinders the 
theory advanced in this research; rather, it merely answers a complementary question regarding the 
Court-public relationship. They also find that salient issues blunt the Court's impact because salient 
issues are those about which people already have well-ordered beliefs. This is significant because the 
study at hand looks only at salient issues and cases. Implications of evidence regarding Supreme 
Court influence on these issues would seem to suggest that the Court has some power to change 
minds, not to simply help form opinions. This study aims to complement Franklin and Kosaki's 
work so as to offer a broader picture of Supreme Court influence on the public and offer clearer 
implications about any such relationship. 
Johnson and Martin (1998) support the conclusions drawn by Franklin and Kosaki, but 
suggest even further limits on the Court's influence. They posit that the Court may influence the 
1 12 Murphy & Tanenhous 1968 
113 Hetherington & S mith 2007 
114 Petrick 1968, Franklin & Kosaki 1989, Mondak 1992, Johnson & Martin 1998 
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public in accord with the structural change hypothesis, but any kind of influence only occurs after the 
first major ruling on a given issue: subsequent rulings have no effect. Tracking single issues across 
time, the expectations for this study are fundamentally at odds with the limitations put forth by 
Johnson et. al. (1998). 
In sum, a theoretically sound and scientifically verifiable approach to analyzing Supreme Court 
influence on public opinion is lacking. The absence of a unified scholarly voice on the topic, and 
even on the approach to studying the topic, is not altogether surprising, considering the relatively few 
specific inqniries into the idea of Supreme Court influence on public opinion. Furthermore, there are 
limitations inherent in the study of an institution with the power to handpick the issues it addresses 
combined with the study of a free public whose preferences have only recenrly become well 
documented. This research attempts to go some way towards filling this gap and standardizing the 
approach through which future research on the topic might utilize, by implementing a new method 
that pairs external validity with formulaic consideration for accuracy and error. 
After determining that public opinion influences not only Supreme Court decisions but rather 
the outputs of all three branches of government, Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson (2002, 2008) 
extend the thermostat analogy and turn the casual arrow around for Congressional policy-looking 
at public mood!15 as a function of policy and finding a negative relationship. As policy becomes more 
liberal the public mood becomes more conservative, or in other words, as policy moves in one 
ideological direction, the public has a logical increased desire for policy in the other direction. The 
Macro Polity model will be employed in this research to extend the analysis of mood as a function of 
policy into the realm of policy espoused in Supreme Court decisions. 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND HYPOTHESES 
The central predication of this research is that Supreme Court decisions do, in fact, influence 
public opinion. However, this proposition is not intended to act counter to evidence suggesting that 
public opinion influences the Court; rather, it is a supplemental study aimed at uncovering a more 
complete picture of this relationship as a two way street. One side of the street is paved, the other 
currently in its primitive stages of construction. 
In order to test the dynamic part of this relationship, the part that points the casual arrow from 
Supreme Court decisions back to the public, I will use the portion of testing done in The Macro Polity 
that looks at mood as a function of policy (2002, 2008) as a model. In their study, Erikson, 
MacKuen, and Stimson create an index by awarding a -1 (conservative) or + 1 (liberal) to each piece 
of significant (as defined in David Mayhew's two sweep test) legislation! 16, and then taking the 
cumulative sum of these scores to create one score for each biennium. Using this score as the key 
115 Stimson 2012 
116 May hew 1991 
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independent variable they run an Ordinary Least Squares regression to analyze the influence of policy 
on public mood (using Stlmson's public mood data) controlling for the effects of the economy on 
mood, specifically inflation and unemployment indicators. As previously mentioned, their testing 
ultimately concludes there is a negative relationship regarding policy influence on mood; thus, a 
representation of the thermostat analogy. 
Based on this model, I approach Supreme Court decisions in much the same way that Erikson 
et. al. approach policy. Looking at Court cases from 1969-2008,117 I consider only salient cases,1l8 and 
of those, only cases involving race, religion, or sex (discrimination, privacy, etc.) issues119, There are 
multiple defenses for this emphasis on salience. First, it is consistent with The Macro Polity model, 
which only looks at salient policy.'20 Second, it is most interesting to understand the public's 
relationship and interaction with the Court on issues that matter most to both groups. Finally, 
research has shown that the Court is most likely to defy public opinion on salient cases.'2' Therefore, 
in an attempt to look at the back and forth between the Court and the public, it is best to look at 
cases in which there is not complete harmony between the Court decision and public preference. The 
idea here is that, whether or not the public is aware or has any knowledge of the decisions, salient 
cases in these issue domains are the ones most likely to matter, which is different than influence; if it 
were otherwise, this study would be irrelevant. 
The restrictions mentioned above leave 146 cases for analysis, with an average of just under 
four cases per year. In accord with Erikson et. al., each decision was given one of five scores: -1, -0.5, 
0, 0.5, 1. Negative values indicate a conservative decision, positive values indicate a liberal decision, 
and zero indicates a decision that is neither liberal nor conservative.I22 A score of -0.5 or 0.5 was 
awarded when the decision was obviously narrow in scope or left open the clear possibility of a 
different decision given slightly different circumstances.'23 The sum of the scores in each year was 
produced to create a cumulative decision score per year. 
117 This is a post-Warren Court case pool. The Warren Court is often said to be the most activist Court of all 
time-here we look at the influence of supposedly less activist courts. This time period is also convenient, in 
that public mood data becomes much more reliable around the 1960s. 
118 Epstein and Segal (2000) provide a \.videly accepted operationalization of salient cases to be those appearing 
on the front page of the New Ym:k Tillles the day after the decision was released. 
11<) These three issue domains are broad enough to include a wide range of opinions, but they are also issues 
about which people are not only likely to have formed opinions but those with which they have personal 
experience. 
120 Erikson et. al. 2002 
121 Casillas et. aJ. 2011 
122 Only a handful of zeros were awarded, and all were cases in which the Court unanimously decided not to 
decide and remand for more information. 
123 In addition to a single primary coder, intercoder reliability was confirmed with three additional coders 
looking at a random sample of ten decisions from the case pool. There was 100 percent consistency across all 
four coders in terms of the ideological direction of the 10 cases and 83 percent consistency as to the value 
itself. 
The cumulative decision score per year will be the independent variable of focus, representing 
the annual nature of Supreme Court ourputs. Implementing Ordinary Least Squares regression, the 
analysis will focus on the relationship between this independent variable and the single dependent 
variable: change in public mood.124 Stimson's policy mood indicator is an amalgamated index that 
produces a single score to represent the aggregate shift along the liberal-conservative continuum of 
public mood over time by combining policy preferences of survey respondents across many different 
issues. Stimson's mood data is publicly available125 and was last updated in 2011. 
It is important to note that the data used in this research are not the raw mood scores. Instead, 
for the purposes of this analysis, the value produced by taking the change in mood from the previous 
year to the current year is used. Using a change score ensures that the direction of causality suggested 
is, indeed, the one being tested. In the form of a quasi-experimental design, we have the mood 
measure before the year of decisions, then the experimental treatment of Supreme Court decisions, 
and then the mood measure following those decisions. By subtracting the pre-experimental measure 
from the post-experimental measure, we can determine the effect of the experimental treatment. 
Looking at overall mood as a product of time-lagged decision scores would be a useful avenue 
for future research to pursue; however, the change score lends itself much better to the study at hand 
for a variety of reasons.'26 Though change scores are limited to shorr term analysis, they ensure the 
appropriate direction of causality, as mentioned above. Further, looking at change scores eliminates 
the chance that any relationship suggested by the data is only a long-term, possibly spurious, 
relationship. Isolating annual change in mood is therefore the best, though not the only, choice of 
dependent variables for this study. Thus, the focus of the analysis will ask the question: does the 
short-term change in tenor of Supreme Court decisions produce short-term change in mood? 
Finally, with the annual decision score as the key independent variable influencing the 
dependent change in mood, I also conrrol for fluctuations in the economy (inflation and 
unemployment),127 and the ideal point'28 and ideology of the Court.'2' Both sets of scores are given 
individually to each Justice. I took the average of these scores for each year to produce one ideal 
124 Stimson 2012 
125 These data are available at W\vw.unc.edu/ �jstimson/Data.html. 
12<> Overall public mood is a cumulative, or developing, score, so to look at mood, rather than change in mood, 
the effects would probably not be seen 'without a large time lag. This type of analysis is beyond the scope of 
this research given the data collected. The case pool is 146 cases over 40 years, just under an average of four 
per year. Each annual time lag would eliminate one data point from a relatively small pool. Future research 
might additionally look at cases 10 to 20 years earlier so a time lag could be conducted with more confidence 
and thereby add another dimension to the research. 
127 It is well known that the state of the economy affects public mood (Erikson et. al. 2002); however, I 
anticipate that its influence, and thus its relevance, will be diminished when looking at change in mood rather 
than overall mood. Nevertheless, inflation and unemployment variables were included just to be certain. 
'28 Martin & Quinn 2002 
129 Segal & Cover 1989 
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point score and one ideology score for the entire Court in each year.130 The Martin-Quinn ideal 
point score offers a dynamic indicator of Court preference, with a new score given for every year an 
individual Justice serves. The Segal-Cover ideology score, which assigns a single value to each Justice 
for the duration of their time on the Court, offers a more stable and consistent indicator of Court 
preferences. Thus, we can control for multiple aspects of possible influence of Justices' influence on 
public mood that might bypass the Supreme Court decisions. 
The expectation for this research is that there is an identifiable influence of Supreme Court 
decisions on public mood, but I propose the nature of this relationship to be opposite that of the one 
found when at mood as a function of Congressional policy. Whereas there is a negative relationship 
between Congressional policy and mood, consistent with the thermostat analogy (as policy becomes 
warmer/more liberal there is an increased desire from the public for cooler/more conservative 
policy), I predict a positive relationship between Supreme Court decisions and public mood. The 
Court is neither a representative nor elected institution, and therefore the public may not attempt to 
control the thermostat in the same way they do a Congressional body. Rather, it is plausible, and here 
expected, that the public listens to the Court as authoritative and final, recognizing their lack of 
control over the unelected body. In this way, I propose that Supreme Court decisions act as a 
recalibration of the thermostat, with the public meeting the Court closer to its espoused temperature, 
and d,en taking any qualms to Congress from this new playing field.13! 
Finally, I predict the level of agreement between Justices to make a difference. When looking 
only at unanimous decisions, I expect the above stated positive relationship \vill become stronger. A 
unanimous Court seems to put forth a certainty and finality that will be felt by the public. By the 
same token, greater dissent within the Court will signal a lack of cohesion, certainty, and therefore 
finality that will reduce the malleahility of public mood. Thus, I predict the relationship between 
130 The idea of using the average score of the three most ideologically moderate Justices in each y ear was 
considered but ultimately rejected. Though it is true that the more moderate Justices often act as the deciding 
votes in salient cases, and therefore the ideal points and ideologies of these Justices have a greater influence on 
the decision that ultimately reaches the public, this aspect is accounted for in the score given to each case. 
Instead, these variables are meant to control for the influence that the nature of the Court and its members, 
outside of its decisions, has on the public. While tIl s might be interesting, it is not the focus of the study and 
could potentially cloud the results. It seems plausible that when people look at the Court they respond more to 
a Scalia than a Kennedy; therefore, the average of the entire Court is what the public sees and what they would 
be influenced by (if at all) when considering decisions. In this way, these variables are supplemental and help to 
control for knowledge of the Court and its decisions-since I do not see either knowledge or awareness as a 
precondition for possible influence. 
131 How the public responds to Supreme Court decisions is different than how it responds to the Supreme 
Court. For the sake of theory, I propose that the public may indeed respond in accord with the thermostat 
analogy regarding the makeup of the Court, whlIe at the same time demonstrating a positive relationship 
regarding decisions put forth by the same Court. This is why it is important to ensure we are looking at the 
decision of the Court absent the influence of individual Justices. 
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Supreme Court decisions with three or four dissents will be weaker, if it even exists, than the 
influence of all cases.132 
FINDINGS 
The initial analysis looks at the influence of all the Supreme Court decisions in the case pool, 
divided into annual units with a single cumulative case score, on the change in public mood. Using 
annual decision scores, average ideology of the Court, average ideal point of the Court, 
unemployment rate, and inflation rate as the independent variables, OLS determines that we are 
explaining 24 percent of the variance, statistically significant at the 0.1 level. In this regression, annual 
decision score is statistically significant at the 0.1 level and in the expected direction, with a positive 
B-value of .319. Average ideology of the Court and average ideal point of the Court were also 
statistically significant at the 0.1 level. It is important to note that inflation rate came nowhere near 
approaching statistical significance as a predictor of change in mood,133 thus the model was repeated 
without inflation as an independent variable. 
In the new model, the independent variables still explain 24 percent of all variance; further, 
this explanatory power is now statistically significant at the 0.05 level. The key independent variable 
of annual Supreme Court decision score now has a strong positive relationship with change in mood, 
and is statistically significant at the 0.05 level.134 For every one unit increase in the liberalism of the 
annual cumulative decision score, there is a .323 unit increase in the liberalism of overall public 
mood, holding all other variables fixed. These data are consistent with the hypothesis. 
Brand new, issue specific public mood data is currently being produced by Stimson and his 
team. Though the project is in its primitive stages, mood data for two issues, abortion and race,135 is 
now available dating back to the late 1960's and early 1970's.136 Issue specific data allows the addition 
of a deeper dimension to this research. It is a dimension ripe for exploration that will offer more 
reliable results than attempting to track public opinion data using individual questions or cases as has 
been done in the past. In order to use these data most effectively a race case decision score and an 
132 As a point of clarification, I stand by the fact that knowledge and awareness of the decision are not 
necessary preconditions for possible influence. The idea here is that the numerical divide representing the 
degree of the dissent need not be known in order to be felt through alternate channels. 
133 Lack of significance of both inflation and employment was anticipated due to the use of change scores as 
the dependent variable; however because inflation received a p value of . 913, its inclusion may be interfering 
with the results. 
134 Average ideology of the Court also moves to statistical significance at the . 05 level, while average ideal point 
of the Court remains statistically significant at the 0. 1 level. 
135 Average ideology and average ideal point were added to the equation with these issue specific tests in mind, 
otherwise it would seem the two variables were getting at largely the same thing. The more stable measure of 
ideology was added for the very stagnant issue of abortion, and the more dynamic measure of ideal point was 
added for the dynamic issue of race. Additionally, it was assumed that ideology would not be a good indicator 
for race given the changing ideological position on race during this time period. 
136 These data are produced in the same way as overall mood scores as discussed on page eleven, but for issue 
specific polling data only. The data are available at www.unc.edu/ �jstimson/Data.html. 
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abortion case decision score was created for each annual term using the same method as was used for 
the initial analysis of all cases. Thus, we apply a test that looks at change in race mood as a function 
of cumulative race case decision scores and change in abortion mood as a function of cumulative 
abortion case decision scores. 
The setup for this model is nearly identical. However, when looking at race mood as a 
function of race case decision scores, the average ideal point of the Court is used as the key indicator 
to pick up the influence of preferences of the Justices themselves. Race is a dynamic issue that calls 
for use of a dynamic value; both the issue of race and public opinion towards racial issues have 
changed considerably over the course of the time period under study. Furthermore, because of the 
way the issue of race has evolved, ideology would not be an accurate way to get at preferences 
regarding the issue. By the same token, abortion is a static issue;137 neither the issue, nor public 
opinion towards it, has shown much variation over time. When looking at abortion mood as a 
function of abortion case decision scores, the average ideology of the Court is used as the key 
indicator to pick up the preference of the Justices themselves. 
The race model does not pass the significance test, with a p value of .1 03, meaning we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis and infer a relationship exits. However, all things considered, and given the 
relatively limited size of the data, a more elaborate, long-term study might not be dissuaded from 
hypothesizing similarly in expectation of a more fruitful yield.!38 
The abortion model, on the other hand, is statistically significant at the 0.1 level and explains 
nearly 41 percent of the variance regarding change in abortion mood. The cumulative decision score 
for abortion cases is a statistically significant indicator for predicting change in abortion mood at the 
0.05 level. Interestingly, though not necessarily surprising, the relationship between abortion decision 
scores and abortion mood is strong and negative; for every one unit change towards more liberal 
Supreme Court decisions regarding abortion there is a -1.27 unit change in liberalism of public mood 
on the issue. In other words, more liberal Supreme Court abortion decisions lead to a public desire 
for more conservative abortion policy. 
Because abortion is systematically an outlying issue,!39 and attitudes towards it simply tend not 
to change much at all, it is actually guite logical that regarding this particular issue there would be a 
negative relationship between Court decisions and public mood. People will not simply accept 
variation on this issue as authoritative and final. Furthermore, it is important to note that this 
137 This is a trend verified by ample polling data tracking the issue. 
138 Although we cannot infer a relationship exists vtith a p value of . 103, if we were to entertain the idea that a 
slightly larger case pool might reduce the p value the small amount necessary to infer a relationship exists, then 
it would be worthy to note that, looking past the F test to the T test, the race case decision score is statistically 
significant at the 0 .05 level. Furthermore, the relationship is strong and positive. 
139 e.g . Caldeira & Gibson 1992 
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negative relationship concerning a generally unique issue does not cause the breakdown of the overall 
model; rather, it allows us to theorize a better, more concrete model that looks at public mood as a 
function of all of the Supreme Court decisions in the original case pool minus abortion cases. 
Rerunning the OLS regression this way, we are able to explain 31 percent of the variance, statistically 
significant at the .05 level. Furthermore, the Supreme Court decision score minus abortion decisions 
variable is positive, strong, and statistically significant at the 0.01 level. For every one unit increase in 
liberalism in decision score there is a .512 unit increase in the liberalism of public mood. These data 
go a long way in providing additional evidence in support of the primary hypothesis of this study. 
Next, we look to more rigorously examine this story about Supreme Court influence on public 
mood and opinion by investigating the unanimity aspect of the decisions. There is a predicted 
interaction here, meaning Supreme Court decisions do different things to public mood depending on 
a third variable: degree of unanimity.l4D In this portion of the research, Supreme Court decisions are 
grouped according to their number of dissents: decisions with zero or one dissents are considered 
highly unanimous, while decisions with three or four dissents are considered to be highly divided. 
Running the model exactly the same way for only those decisions put forth with unanimity, we 
anticipate a stronger, positive relationship to emerge (see Figure 1). In fact, we find the unanimous 
decision model to explain about 44 percent of the variance, statistically significant at the 0.05 level. 
The decision score indicator for explaining change in mood is statistically significant at the 0.05 level 
with a strong, positive B value of .93.141 This is consistent with the hypothesis and is logically 
pleasing-the more certain the Court is of their decision, demonstrated through unanimity, the more 
stock the public is willing to give the decision. 
Finally, in order to examine the alternate segment of the hypothesis we conduct one last 
regression using only highly divided decisions (three or four dissents) to detertnine the annual 
decision score, and use this as our key independent variable for predicting change in mood (see 
Figure 2). As expected, the findings indicate no statistical significance of any kind and do not even 
lend a hint of directionality of a potential relationship for future study. In other words, Supreme 
Court decisions completely lacking unanimity offer no explanatory power for determining the short­
term change in public mood. 
140 Here, degree of unanimity is taken solely as the number of dissenters. Though the limitation of this 
operationalization is noted-not all dissents, or dissenters, are created equally. 
141 Only 39 individual case scores qualified for this grouping of cases. This is a clear limitation, but also suggests 
that the data may actually underestimate the reality of this relationship. 
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Figure 1: Mood Change and Highly Figure 2: Mood Change and Highly 
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Table 1 presents a summary of all fmdings. We can conclude that Supreme Court decisions 
influence public mood and that this relationship is positive. Furthermore, the positive relationship is 
strengthened by excluding abortion cases and when looking only at highly unanimous decisions (both 
over all cases, and cases regarding a single issue). Thus, there is an interaction concerning Supreme 
Court influence on public mood, depending on unanimity of the espoused decision. We cannot 
conclude a relationship exists between decisions lacking unanimity and public mood 
2JJ 
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Table 1: Change in Mood as a Function of Supreme Court Decisions 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Decision Score 2.028** 2.241** -2.642** 2.805** 2.592** 1.206 
(.323) (.514) (-1.270) (.512) (.930) (.257) 
.312 .400 -.648 .409 .539 .218 
Unemployment 1.216 .863 1.815* 1.193 .994 .511 
(.217) (.150) (.418) (.203) (.221) (.100) 
.187 .156 .467 .175 .204 .093 
Ideology -2.357** -1.619 -2.575** -2.143** -.152 
(-5.655) (-6.969) (-5.880) (-6.404) (-.456) 
-.368 -.393 -.382 -.466 -.027 
Ideal Point -1.785** -1.871 * -1.621 -1.921* -1.598 
(-.546) (.496) (-.470) (-.562) (-.502) 
-.282 .340 -.243 -.368 -.296 
R Square .241 ** .257 .406* .309** .443** .108 
Note: 
Each column indicates a separate regression: (1) all cases (2) race cases, (3) abortion cases, (4) abortion cases 
eliminated, (5 ) highly unanimous cases, (6) highly divided cases. 
* p < 0.1 ** P < 0.05 *** P < 0.01 
The t-value is listed first, followed by the B-value in parentheses, and then the Beta Weight. 
Average ideology and average ideal point are consistently negative, and frequcnrly significant. This can be taken 
to mean that the public can respond negatively to the Court itself but dissociate that from acceptance and 
internalization of the decisions. 
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
This study does not attempt to upend the work suggesting public influence on the Supreme 
Court. Instead, the research in this study deepens the understanding of the relationship between the 
Court and the public in a way that begins to remedy the cognitive dilemma that Dahl wrote of so 
many years ago. The Supreme Court does function as a political player in the American form of 
government. The positive response hypothesis, oringinally put forth by Dahl (1957), but more 
recendy rejected by Johnson and Martin (1998) and others, carries weight in American politics 
beyond an attempt by the Court to ensure legitimacy of decisions. Certainly, this research does not 
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try to advance the notion of a purely positive response from the public to Court decisions, and even 
presents abortion as a counter example. The power of the Court to influence the public may be 
limited (or enhanced) by judicial capital, among a number of other factors; however, multiple forms 
of testing confirm that the Court can, and does, influence the public on salient issues (i.e. race, 
abortion) at least some of the time. Thus, taken together with evidence that the public likewise 
influences Supreme Court decisions, we are left with a picture of a paved and functioning two way 
street-a dialog between groups that were never intended to speak. 
At this point, it is worth reemphasizng the magnitude of the questions asked and answered in 
this study. The Supreme Court is a small unelected branch of the great American democracy, and yet 
the evidence holds from multiple angles that the American people are swayed and influenced by it in 
ways not mirrored by the elected branches. Again, in a study of salient issues and cases about which 
most people are said to have fixed opinions based on experience or proximity, we fmd a significant 
positive relationship between Supreme Court decisions and subsequent public mood in the short­
term. The Supreme Court plays a role in changing (not merely forming) the minds and mood of at 
least some portion of the public. 
Judicial activism is a term thrown around by politicians and the public alike. Though no one 
defIninition necessarily encompasses the term better than another, it is generally thought to refer to 
the amount of deference the Court gives to Congressional policy. This study, completely uninterested 
in supporting or renouncing the accusations of judicial activism that seem wildly popular in current 
political culture, may function to refine the working defInition of judical activism as it stands. 
Perhaps activism should not be viewed in terms of deference granted to Congress by the Court, but 
rather in terms of deference granted to the Court by the public. Indeed, this would make the Court 
"active" in all senses of the word. Using judicial capital to create an artitude of deference from the 
American public results in what appears to be popular internalization and acceptance of Supreme 
Court decisions, for better or worse.142 
Certainly, the conclusions drawn must be viewed in light of the data used in the study: three 
salient issue domains and 40 years of Supreme Court decisions for a total of 146 salient decisions 
delievered to the American people. Future research might look to extend this study by both 
deepening and broadening the case pool. The time period limitation was discussed in an earlier 
portion of this paper, but to reiterate, a larger time period would allow for a more confident use of a 
time lag, which would add a long-term dimension to this short-term study. Furthermore, opening up 
142 Whether or not the S upreme Court puts forth apolitical, or anti-agenda decisions is beyond the scope of this 
paper although in this day of extreme polarization it is hard to imagine this might be so. 
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the case pool to include additional issue domains would go a long way in solidifying the evidence put 
forth in this analysis!43. 
Nevertheless, certain limitations will always surround the study of the Supreme Court and 
public opinion. Most notably, there is no systematic way to control for the social forces that effect 
both Supreme Court decisions and public mood. This problem is greatly minimized, if not eliminated 
completely, by the use of change in mood scores rather than raw mood scores, and the use of safety­
net economic indicators. However, any attempt to expand this study to a long-term analysis will have 
to grapple with the social forces that undeniably come with the terrain. 
Finally, further investigation into the notion and workings of judicial capital logically follows 
the study at hand. Theoretically, we can explain the evidence of the Court's influence on the public 
by way of judicial capital: the Court uses its capital to acqnire legitimacy of its decisions from the 
public, which subsequently turns into internal acceptance by the public. A scientific and 
psychological understanding of how the transfer from external acceptance (legitimacy) to internal 
acceptance (opinion) takes place would add a fluid and confident wholesomeness to the study of the 
Court-public relationship. As it stands, the evidence produced in this research already points to a 
well-developed, dynamic relationship between the Supreme Court and public opinion. It appears the 
"least dangerous branch" is something of a dark horse in the conversation that is the American 
Democracy. 
143 Public mood is a cumulative index that considers public opinion on many issues (e.g., gun control, 
healthcare. education); therefore, a model that included Supreme Court decisions from as many of those issues 
as possible would be best for this kind of study. 
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THE MYTH OF THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS: CONFUCIAN VALUES AND 
DEMOCRATIC SUPPORT 
Xinlin Xu 
Abstract: Literatllre 011 political ctllttlre claims COlljilcianism is incompatible with modern liberal democratic val lies. 
HOlVever, little empirical evidence has been pl�sellted to prove the validity of this statement. This paper qllalltitativefy 
stlldies the re!atiollship beflve", Cotifllcian val lies and democratic support in East Asian society and finds 110 negative 
concdatio!l benveen the iJvo. 
INTRODUCTION 
In Clash of Civilizations, Samuel Huntington predicts that the post-Cold War world conflict 
would be a clash between western liberal democratic ideals and the eastern traditions of 
Confucianism and Islam. It has been taken for granted by many that Confucianistp is a hindrance to 
democratic consolidation, and its emphasis on maintaining a hierarchical society is claimed to 
promote social inequality. Li (2012) argues that the role-based society that Confucianism endorses 
discourages individualism and represses individual spontaneity. Confucianism requires that each 
person behave in accordance with his or her role in society. All these Confucian ideas are found to 
contradict modern democratic ideologies. This leads to a question: should countries that have 
Confucian traditions alter their historical roots for the sake of democratization and democratic 
consolidation? To answer this question, one must fIrst determine the compatibility of Confucianism 
and modern democratic values. Though scholars have researched this topic extensively through 
analysis of Confucian texts, the lack of empirical studies makes it diffIcult to draw defmitive 
conclusions. 
This paper examines how Confucianism directly and indirectly influences support for 
democracy at the individual level and fInds no negative correlation between the two, as Huntington 
had predicted. Confucianism is deconstructed into Elitism, Familism, Preference for Harmony, and 
Respect for Authority. Their corresponding effects on individuals' support for democracy are 
explored. This research does not merely examine the Confucian texts alone, but rather focuses on 
the Confucian principles that are practiced by the society. It tries to provide a new interpretation of 
the role Confucianism plays in the development of political culture in modern and post-modern East 
Asian society. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The prevailing assumption, articulated by Huntington in his Clash of the Civilizatiolls, is that 
Confucian thought is inherently anti-democratic. He believes that maintaining order and respecting 
hierarchy constitute the central tenets of Confucianism, and that these ideas repress the development 
of individualism. Other researchers, including Chenyang Li, question the compatibility of democracy 
and Confucianism as well. Li argues that Confucianism embraces both numerical and proportional 
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equality. Numerical equality indicates that all human beings are endowed with the same capacity for 
moral culrivation.l44 Moral equality does not imply that all people have the same starus; rather, it 
dictates that people with the same roles, such as fathers and husbands, are given the same kind of 
responsibilities and entitlements. Li calls such equality "role based numerical equality."145 
Proportional equality, or "equality relative to people's due," is another fundamental principle in 
Confucianism. According to this notion, some form of division of labor based on social stratification 
is necessary. Confucianism promotes the concept of xial1, which means virtuous and talented. A 
person with such qualities must be well educated and equipped with superb moral achievement, 
consequently deserving high starus in society.146 Though advocating that everyone should have equal 
opporrunities to be educated, Confucianism recognizes that only xian people could bear the 
responsibility of managing a state. Li also argues that with Confucian proportional equality comes 
political inequalities that contradict the fundamental values underlying modern democracy.14' Based 
on this analysis, political Confucianism is theoretically incompatible with modern notions of political 
equality. 
Other scholars have a more positive attitude towards the compatibility between Confucianism 
and democratic ideals. Fukuyama argues that Confucianism is relatively tolerant and has potential 
egalitarian implications, in that everyone is entitled to receive equal opporrunity to cultivate himself 
or herself into a virruous being.148 Chen also argues that Confucian values are compatible with 
modern liberal democracy. She claims the Confucian practices of "personal cultivation ... and the 
moral responsibility of the holders of power" can prevent the tendency of over-materialization of 
modern society.14' In addition, He summarizes four ideal-type models of the relationship between 
Confucianism and democracy: conflict, compatible, hybrid, and critical.150 He notes in the conflict 
model that Confucianism lacks the concept of negative liberty, which is the freedom to act free of 
exterior interferences. But he also argues that the conflict model overstates the negative role of 
Confucianism and overlooks the possibility of compatibility, consequently downplaying the 
likelihood of a Confucian contribution to democratization. However, he admits that empirically, the 
conflict model was much more accurate than the compatibility model in the early stages of 
democratization in East Asia.ls1 
144 Li 2012, 297 
145 Ibid., 299 
146 Ibid., 306 
147 Li 2012, 308 
148 Fukuyama 1995, 25 
149 Chen 2007, 211 
150 He 2010, 19 
151 Ibid., 30 
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Some scholars have conducted empirical research on Confucianism as well as on political 
culture in East Asian countries. In Democratization in Conftlcian EastAsia, Zhengxu Wang (2007) argues 
that citizens with stronger self-expression values are more likely to be critical citizens. He shows that 
economic development and social modernization in Confucian Asia results in stronger self­
expression values which in turn give rise to democratic citizenship in these societies. Wang does not 
examine how self-expression tendencies are correlated with Confucianism, but he does raise the 
important concept of self-expression values, which have played a non-negligible role in shaping civic 
culture in Confucian societies. Another empirical study done by Qi (2008) finds that Confucian 
values are negatively correlated with democratic support. However, this study did not unravel the 
mechanism through which such negative effects took place. Moreover, this study did not deconstruct 
Confucianism and investigate which doctrine or concept specifically undermined democratic support. 
At this point, no research has been done to depict the exact mechanism through which 
Confucian thought affects support for democracy at the individual level. This study aims to 
empirically test this correlation as well as the mechanism through which Confucianism can indirectly 
affect individuals' support for democracy. 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
This research employs a large-N statistical model using data from the Asian Barometer (AB) 
Wave 2 conducted between 2004 and 2008. The analysis presented in this paper is from a set of 
structural equation models (SEM) employing Maximum Likelihood. Variables are first set up in an 
assumed causal sequence, with each variable being regressed on all variables that precede it in the 
chain. A path model enables the test of direct correlations between a particular Confucian value and 
individuals' support for democracy. It examines correlations suggested by existing political culture 
theories--such as the social capital theory--that can indirectly affect democratic support. This model 
requires the deconstruction of Confucianism into measurable variables. Confucianism covers a broad 
range of topics, such as humanity, morality, governance, and etiquetre. This study is based on the 
theoretical framework raised by Weiming Tu, which divides the ideology into two categories: political 
Confucianism and Confucian personal ethics. 
In order to measure Confucianism, one needs first to define every variable in the model. 
Elitism is one of the most prominent doctrines in Confucianism. Bell describes elitism as the "rule of 
the wise;" it exemplifies the ideal that "the best and the brightest" should exert more influence in 
order to build a good society.152 Confucius claims: "In government, the secret is Integrity. Use it, and 
you'll be like the polestar: always dwelling in its proper place the other stars tuming reverently about 
152 Bell 2006, 157 
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it."153 This statement shows that political Confucianism values the virtues of a ruler. The ruler shall 
establish himself as a moral exemplar and shall be well educated. Moreover, by likening an ideal ruler 
to a "polestar," Confucius affirms his belief in the centrality of the role rulers perform in state 
management. 
Confucianism is also governed by a fundamental principle of harmony. In the political realm, 
Confucianism means a well-rounded sociopolitical order governed by Ii, which involves "the 
behavior of persons related to each other in terms of role, status, rank, and position within a 
structured society."154 Such a strong tendency towards conformity is characterized as one form of 
Preference for Harmony. Another aspect that exemplifies this charactetistic is Confucian personal 
ethics, which advocates litigation avoidance in solving private disputes. As recorded in The Allalects: 
"I can hear a court case as well as anyone. But we need to make a world where there's no reason for 
a court case."155 Confucianism claims that if everyone in society has courtesy and treats others in a 
benevolent and altruistic manner, then harmony can be maintained and no dispute will take place. 
The Confucian personal ethic states that it is necessary to obey family elders, whose decisions 
should be followed and respected. It also stresses that one's personal behavior must honor the 
ancestors. These claims are conceptualized as Familism in this study. Confucian petsonal ethic 
encourages a harmonious and cooperative society by stipulating strict moral codes regarding respect 
that must be performed among people with different hierarchical status. Moreover, two notions of 
self are clearly differentiated in the Confucian tradition: the small self and the great self. The small 
self is the limited self. It operates as a force of inertia that resists further development. The great 
self, on the other hand, goes beyond self-centeredness. It not only relates to the family, dle society, 
the state, and beyond to the world at large, but also establishes these relationships as "part of its own 
sensitivity and concern."156 In other words, familism embodies a certain degree of self-sacrifice when 
conflicts rise between personal and family interests. 
The Confucian ideology also promotes a role-based society, where everyone has his or her 
own entidements and responsibilities, according to which each individual acquires his or her due 
equality. Confucius specifies five relationships: rulers and subjects, fathers and sons, husbands and 
wives, elder and younger brothers, and finally friends and friends. He maintains that if individuals 
observe these relationships properly, the society will stabilize itself. This observation of social 
hierarchy is conceptualized as Respect for Authority. 
When studying the correlation between political culture and democracy, it is worth examining 
the social capital theory, which integrates sociology and economics to study civic tradition as well as 
153 Confucius 1998, 11 
154 Schwartz 1985, 67 
155 Confucius and Hinton 1998, 132 
156Tu 
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political dynamics. In other words, besides direct correlations, Confucian values may affect 
democratic support at the inclividual level through other mechanisms suggested by literature on 
political culture. Social capital theorists have shown that social trust and democratic consolidation are 
positively correlated.157 Inglehart argues that social trust is essential for people to view political 
opponents as a loyal opposition and is strongly correlated with stable democracy.l58 Coleman (1988) 
contends that a system of mutual trust is an important form of social capital through which future 
obligations and expectations may be based. Regarding social trust, Putman draws a clistinction 
between "thick trust," which is "embedded in personal relations," and "thin trust," which extends to 
other people within the community. Though this clichotomy has been criticized for failing to 
characterize the complexity of social trust in the real world, it is especially appropriate for stuclies 
East Asian countries. Qi argues that Confucian personal ethics encourage people to "pursue interests 
and seek social exchanges" within "in-groups"l59 where the "thick trust" applies. She also finds that, 
in countries influenced by Confucianism, such particular trust is negatively correlated with general 
interpersonal trust in society.IGO Therefore, this study will also incorporate General Trust as an 
intervening variable to test whether Confucian values indirectly influence democratic support by 
altering social capital. 
Another concept raised by Inglehart is the postmaterialist value, which emboclies tolerance, 
quality of life, self-expression, intellectual and aesthetic needs, etc.IGI He finds that postmaterialist 
values contribute to people's declining confidence in hierarchical institutions, which in turn 
strengthen their support for democracy.lG2 This theory has been confirmed in Wang's study on 
democratization in Confucian East Asian countries. Based on this study, I incorporated Self­
Expression values as another intervening variable. By influencing this variable, Confucian values 
could possibly have an indirect impact on individuals' support for democracy. In measuring self­
expression values, I extracted the elements comparatively relevant to democratic support. 
Individuals' interest in and willingness to participate in politics is used as an indicator of the level of 
self-expression values; individuals' potential for civil disobedience is another. John Rawls defines civil 
clisobeclience as "politically-motivated, public, non-violent and conscientious breach of law 
undertaken with the aim of bringing about a change in laws or government policies."IG3 Civil 
clisobeclience is a call to conscience when no other means of self-expression is found adequate or 
157 Inglehart 1997; Putnam 1993 and 2000; Fukuyama 1995; Newton 2001 
158 Inglehart 1997, 172-173 
159 Qi 2008, 9 
lGOIbid., 17-19 
161 Inglehart 1997,109-130 
162 Ibid., 299 
163 Rawls, 1971 
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satisfactory. Therefore, the level of one's potential for civil disobedience reflects one's aspiration for 
liberty and inclination to act in self-defense through public expression. 
Democracy is a concept that resists attempts to objectively define. Schmitter and Karl 
recapitulate nine "procedural minimum" conditions for democracy,l64 while Whitehead argues that all 
definitions of democracy are contextually based.165 However, regardless of the definitions of 
democracy, there is a consensus on the liberal political ideal that laid the foundation of democracy. 
The ideal of liberty claims that all men are born equal, and as a result, they all have natural rights to 
life, to property, and to civil freedoms of association. All individuals are equally entitled to exercise 
the rights listed above, irrespective of their sex, race, religion, or political views. As implied by liberal 
democratic ideals, political equality is a prereqnisite for modern democracy. Though unequal 
distribution of political resources poses the question of whether political equality can be realized or 
not, the goal of political equality still has its intrinsic merits.166 On the surface, the Confucian idea of 
proportional equality, which implies that virtuous people should run the government, conflicts with 
the modern ideal of political equality. Proportional equality resembles Dahl's concept of 
guardianship, which states that only qualified elites can govern for the common good.167 Dahl argues 
that guardians who make moral judgments based on the "science of ruling" and the knowledge of the 
general good misunderstand the relationship between private and collective interests. Individuals who 
give consent to guardianship based on economic performance are regarded as having lower levels of 
democratic support. 
I synthesized the literature on Confucianism and incorporated social capital and post­
materialist theory to hypothesize a path model that depicts the mechanism by which Confucianism 
generates impact on democratic support at the individual level. The final model of the correlation 
between Confucian values and support for democracy in East Asia will be obtained by dropping all 
the paths that show insignificant correlations. The selection of countries covers China, South Korea, 
Japan, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. The reason I chose these cases is because my study is confmed to 
East Asian countries. All these countries or regions either have had Confucianism as their offlcial 
religion, such as South Korea and Japan, or are occupied by population that is culturally rooted in 
Confucianism, such as Hong Kong and Taiwan.168 
The hypotheses I proposed are outlined in Table 1 below. Elitism, Respect for Authority, 
Familism, and Preference for Harmony are exogenous variables, and the covariances between the 
variables are represented by two-ended arrows. Causal relations between variables are represented by 
164 Schmitter and Karl, 1991, 81-82 
165 Whitehead 2002, 26 
166 Dahl 2006, 36 and 84 
167 Ibid., 53 
168 Lew, Wang and Choi, 2001; Nosco, 1997 
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unidirectional arrows. The unexplained effects are represented by error 1, 2 and 3. In this model, 
direct correlations between every single Confucian value and support for democracy are assumed. 
Further, direct correlations between Confucian values and General Trust as well as Self-Expression 
Values are also represented. The total effect that Confucianism has on democratic support is thus 
calculated by adding up the direct and indirect effects. 
Figure 1: Hypotheses 
Elitism 
Repseet for Authority 
Familism 
Harmony 
MEASUREMENT AND OPERATIONALIZATIO 
Table 1: Measurement of Variables 
Variable 
Elitism 
Respect for 
Authoriry 
Familism 
Measurement 
• "We should get rid of parliament and 
elections and have a strong leader decide 
things." 
• "People with little or no education should 
have as much say in politics as highly­
educated people." 
• "Being a student, one should not question 
the authority of their teacher." 
• "Government leaders are like the head of a 
family; we should all follow their 
decisions." 
• "For the sake of the family, the individual 
should put his personal interests second." 
• "Even if parents' demands are 
unreasonable, children still should do what 
they ask." 
Description 
For both statements, respondents 
choosing "strongly 
disagree/ disapprove" were coded 
as 1) "disagree/disapprove" as 2, 
"agree/ approve" as 3, and 
"strongly agree/approve" as 4. The 
sum score stands for the level of 
elitism. The higher the score, the 
higher the level of elitism. 
Same as above. The higher the 
score, the higher the level of 
respect for authority. 
Same as above. 
Preference 
for 
Harmony 
Out-group 
trust 
Self­
Expression 
Values 
Support for 
democracy 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
"When one has a conflict with a neighbor, 
the best way to deal with it is to 
accommodate the other person." 
"If people have too many different ways of 
thinking, society will be chaotic." 
"Generally speaking, would you say most 
people can be trusted or that you must be 
very careful in dealing with people?" 
"How much trust do you have in other 
people you interact with?" 
"How interested would you say you are in 
politics?" 
"If possible, I don't want to get involved in 
political matters." 
"Citizens should always obey laws and 
regulations, even if they disagree with 
them." 
"If you had to choose between democracy 
and economic development, which would 
you say is more important?" 
''Which of the following statements comes 
closest to your own opinion?" 
Source: Asian Barometer Wave 2 
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Same as above. 
For the first question, "you must be 
very careful in dealing with people" 
was coded as 1, "most people can 
be trusted" as 2. For the second 
question, "none at all" was coded 
as 1, "not very much trust" as 2, 
"quite a lot trust" as 3, and "'a great 
deal of trust" as 4. The sum score 
of these two questions indicates the 
level of out-group trust. 
For the first question, "not at all 
interested" was coded as 1, "not 
very interested" as 2, "somewhat 
interested" as 3, and "very 
interested" as 4. For the second and 
third statements, "strongly agree" 
was coded as 1, "somewhat agree" 
as 2, "somewhat disagree" as 3, and 
"strongly disagree" as 4. The sum 
of these three scores stands for the 
level of self-expression values. 
For the flrst question, "economic 
development is definitely more 
important" was coded as 1) 
"somewhat more important" as 2, 
"equally important" as 3, 
"democracy is somewhat more 
important" as 4, and "democracy is 
definitely more important" as 5. 
For the second question, "it does 
not matter whether we have a 
democracy or not" was coded as 1, 
"under some circumstances, an 
authoritarian government can be 
preferable" as 2, and "democracy is 
always preferable" as 3. The sum 
score of these two questions 
indicates level of support for 
democracy. 
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A reduced model, which shows the correlations between variables, was produced by 
dropping all the insignificant paths in the original one. The path coefficients are shown above each 
arrow. The RMSEA is .017, which is smaller than the .05 required for a good model. Therefore, the 
goodness of fit measure supports the adequacy of this model. The Chi-squire is not used here to test 
the adequacy of this model. First, the finding of significance in the likelihood ratio test of a path 
model can occur even with very small differences of the model-implied and observed covariance 
metrics, especially given the large-N of the samples in this study, which is 9,813. Moreover, since 
Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) tends to inflate Chi-square, RMSEA, an indicator less 
influenced by sample size is used to measure the goodness of fit of this model. 
Figure 2: Reduced Model 
Elitism 
Repseet for Authority 
Familism 
Harmony 
Note: Comparative fit index = 0.986; root mean square error of approximation (Rl\1SEA) = 0.017; 99 percent 
confidence interval for RMSEA = 0.011-0.024; N =9813, Chi-square=28, p<O.OOOl. 
Table 2: Total Effects of Confucian Values on Democratic Attitudes 
Elitism Authority Familism Self-Expression Harmony Trust 
Self-Expression .079 .056 .095 .000 .000 .000 
Trust .000 .000 -.029 .000 .000 .000 
Democracy .065 .009 .014 .162 .020 .061 
In the model, no direct correlation is found between Respect for Authority, Familism and 
Support for Democracy. Familism is found to be negatively correlated with General Trust, which 
confirms Qi's finding that interpersonal trust in East Asian countries tends to undermine general 
social trust. This model also confirms the social capital theory, which states that social trust promotes 
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democratic governance. The model does not fInd any direct negative correlation between the four 
sets of Confucian values and Self-Expression Values. On the contrary, Elitism, Familism and Respect 
for Authority are found to contribute to Self-Expression Values. In this model, Preference for 
Harmony neither contributes to nor undermines General Trust or Self-Expression Values, but 
exhibits a positive correlation with Support for Democracy. The total effects are calculated by adding 
the direct effects, association of one variable with another free from other intervening paths, and 
indirect effects, association of one variable with another mediated through other variables in the 
model. As shown in Table 2, the net effects the four values have on democratic support are all 
positive according to this model, with Self-Expression Values affecting Support for Democracy most 
signifIcantly. 
Familism undermines Support for Democracy by reducing out-group trust, but the net effect 
of Familism on Support for Democracy is nonetheless positive. Furthermore, none of the four sets 
of Confucian values are found, directly or indirectly, to undermine democratic support at the 
individual level. 
CONCLUSIONS 
No negative correlation between Confucian values and democratic support is found in this 
study. On the contrary, a positive correlation, negligible as it is, is presented in the model. Therefore, 
this study does not support the claim made in the Clash of Civilizations stating that a major conflict 
exists between Confucian values and democracy. With the small path coeffIcients, this study neither 
supports the claim that Confucian values could positively contribute to individuals' democratic 
support. However, this study refutes cultural arguments against Confucianism regarding 
democratization or democratic consolidation. 
The constitutional liberties in modern democratic countries, such as freedom of speech and 
religion, belong to negative liberty, which designates rights that can be exercised free from 
interference. However, the correlativity of rights and duties dictates that rights and duties are just two 
sides of a same concept. Confucianism rarely stipulates positive duties people have towards one 
another; rather, it mostly enumerates negative duties, which are actions people shall refrain from 
doing for the benefIt of others. To say A has a duty not to act in a certain way towards B is the same 
as saying that B has a right over A's not acting in that way. The Analects says, "Never impose on 
others what you would not choose for yourself."l6' If each individual in the society attaches 
signifIcant importance to self-autonomy, then everyone else has a duty not to interfere with this 
preference as long as it does not do harm to others. Culture is not stagnant, but rather constantly 
169 Confucius 1998, 176 
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evolving and opening to new interpretation. Confucianism, it appears, is flexible enough to 
accommodate new perspectives. 
One cannot simply conclude a particular culture is pro-authoritarian or will foster the gtowth 
of democratic ideas. Empirically, no evidence is found that Confucianism is incompatible with 
democratic support. Future research should focus on whether institutions established based on 
Confucian values or practices inherited from Confucian traditions have played a role in hindering 
democratization or democratic consolidation. 
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APPENDICES 
Regression Weights 
Estimate S.E. CR. P 
Trust <--- Familism -.011 .004 -2.584 .010 
Self-Expression <--- Familism .093 .012 7.481 *** 
Self-Expression <--- Authority .073 .017 4.287 *** 
Self-Expression <--- Elitism .229 .038 6.018 *** 
Democracy <--- Trust .113 .023 4.950 *** 
Democracy <--- Self-Expression .117 .010 12.223 *** 
Democracy <--- Harmony .022 .013 1.669 .095 
Democracy <--- Elitism .109 .025 4.323 *** 
***p<O.OOOl 
S d eli d R  tan ar ze egresslOn OJg! ts 
Estimate 
Trust <--- Familism -.029 
Self-Expression <--- Familism .095 
Self-Expression <--- Authority .056 
Self-Expression <--- Elitism .079 
Democracy <--- Trust .061 
Democracy <--- Self-Expression .162 
Democracy <--- Harmony .020 
Democracy <--- Elitism .052 
Covariances 
Estimate S.E. CR. P 
Authority <--> Elitism .179 .017 10.671 *** 
Familism <--> Authoril) 1.319 .048 27.563 *** 
Familism <--> Elitism .210 .021 10.166 *** 
Harmony <--> Authoril) .746 .031 24.172 *** 
Harmony <--> Familism .984 .038 26.016 *** 
Harmony <--> Elitism .126 .013 9.497 *** 
S ::,quare d Mul' I C tiple I . orre atlons 
Estimate 
Self-Expression .025 
Trust .001 
Democracy .035 
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NO SMOKING: POLICY DIFFUSION AND ITS PREVAILING FACTORS 
Brad Gresik 
Abstract· Over the past ]eIV years, lIlany states have taken steps to ban sllloking in public areas. The process of 
specific polices spreading across state lines is called poliry difjifSion. 5 tateJvide anti-indoor sllloking bans are utilized to 
demonstrate Ivhat the 1Il0st prevailingfactors ill poliry difjifSioll are. A hvo-step approach to analysis is implellleJIted, 
first looking only at simple poliry adoption among the 50 states, and secondly the rate at lvNch the poliry expands 
across the country. A strongpreseJIce of local ordinallces, nearby neighbors lvith statewide bans in effict, and a history of 
smokingpreelllptioll laws are found to be the most statistically significant of a list of vaJiables. Because difjilsion of this 
poliry is entering its final stages, this research can be used as a refirence for designing and implementingpoliry difjilsioll 
studies in the future. 
INTRODUCTION 
Good ideas simply do not materialize as law in every state. Instead, these ideas slowly spread 
from state to state based on a variety of internal and external factors, a process called policy 
diffusion.170 The phenomenon of progressive ideas spreading due to specific circumstances has long 
been debated by scholars, generally requiring a two-fold examination to understand a policy's 
diffusion. First, one must compare the circumstances of states that have adopted or not adopted the 
policy in question. Once that is established, it becomes necessary to examine why a policy diffused so 
rapidly in some states and lagged in others. The aim of this research is to determine both of these 
components in regard to Anti-Indoor Smoking Bans CAISBs). 
AISBs are important to the study of policy diffusion because they can be broadly applied as 
a model for the study as a whole. This is due to the pressure to pass an AISB coming from different 
levels of federalism. In the past, the push has primarily been from local and state pressure, but as of 
September 2013, federal funding is now being put towards anti-smoking policies. AISBs also 
represent a policy which is still diffusing. For example, Indiana passed a comprehensive AISB in July 
of2012, a full 17 years after Utah pioneered the policy in 1995.'71 AISBs also are important to 
examine because they are "fact-based" rather than a "moral-based" policies.172 For instance, a state 
policymaker can look at same-sex marriage and be morally opposed to it, and in their mindset, have a 
reasonable rationale for excluding that policy. Smoking leading to cancer, heart failure, and stroke is 
something that is an accepted fact in the majority of U.S., which therefore represents an interesting 
take on how a baseline policy can be diffused. Due to these factors, this research can be used as a 
jumping off point for other studies in the future and as a point of comparison. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
A compelling diffusion analogy once observed that "a sense of political 'Stockholm 
Syndrome' exists, where a piece of radical legislation gets passed by the Swedes, then it's flown 
directly to the U.S. and is passed into law in California. Then it's flown to Wisconsin. Then to New 
170 Shipan and Volden 2006 
171 Americans For Non-Smokers' Rights 2013 
172 Shipan and Volden 2006 
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York. By the time it gets to Mississippi, which is about four years later, it's a national birthright.
,,173 
This idea of policy diffusion was fIrst widely made popular with Jack L. Walker Jr.'s 1969 
groundbreaking work "The Diffusion of Innovations among the American States," which still stands 
as a cornerstone of diffusion research.!74 Walker proposed the idea that the country has several 
competitive regional leaders that emulate each other so as not to appear left behind. Using dozens of 
different cases, Walker classifIed states as leaders, pioneers, and followers, defIning their role in the 
diffusion process while leaving many questions to future scholars. Some of these pivotal questions 
include what actually makes a state more or less prone to new ideas, and what is the biggest 
determinant of adoption probability. 
Virginia Gray began to tackle this problem in the years following Walker's work and began 
to better frame the question researchers need to examine. By looking at several different policies 
across what V.O. Key called the "have�not spectrum" including education, welfare, and civil rights, 
Gray determined that it is almost impossible to fInd a catch-all diffusion model that will inherently 
help defIne all future studies. 175 Most importantly, she found that all examinations of policy passage 
need to be observed as time�specifIc, noting that states can change dramatically in as little as a 
decade. Also emphasized was the importance of differing levels of federalism, as policy diffusion 
trends looked completely different in cases where, for example, federal influence was exerted rather 
than just state and local influence. Finally noted was the importance of current political and 
economic conditions of the state during the tirne of passage. For example, a unifIed legislature 
combined with a strong current economy might provide incentive to pass a politically turbulent 
policy where before it might have been overlooked. 
In a direct response to Gray three years later, Robert Eyestone claimed that it would be 
irrational to dismiss policy diffusion as a case�specifIc phenomenon and identifIed key trends that 
drive policy diffusion. Most importantly, it was found that even when a multitude of different 
policies were controlled for, several states were always leaders in early adoption. However, as 
Eyestone notes, "Diffusion patterns may record the spread by necessity rather than the emulation of 
virtue: leaders may lead because they are also the fIrst to suffer industrial growth which creates 
demands for state policy responses.,,!76 Eyestone summarizes that for policy diffusion to be truly 
understood, it must be battered with a multitude of independent variables, as the interactions 
between many allow the true result to reveal themselves. The main message is that for diffusion to be 
understood, many different models with the same policy must be run. A method which can be 
173 Shaw and Renner 2002 
174 Jack L.Walker 1973 
175 Grey 1973 
176 Eyestone 1977 
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inferred from these authors suggests examining both simple adoption of a policy and then going 
back and surveying the rate at wltich that policy was adopted. Without both parts of the puzzle, the 
full story remains obfuscated. 
The next major contribution in policy diffusion theory came with Berry and Berry's 1990 
diffusion analysis. By using the policy of state lottery adoptions, they determined that many previous 
studies had completely ignored the impact of internal factors, such as state legislature and local 
municipality makeup, and external factors, such as the number of nearby state powers with similar 
policies. The usage of a less controversial topic like lotteries as opposed to something more heated 
like gun control also provided future scholars the ability to look at these two different categories as 
separate beasts. In a nutshell, Berry and Berry proved to be ground breaking due to the fact that they 
had concrete proof of three principles: "the probability of state innovation is direcdy related to the 
motivation to innovate, inversely related to the strength of obstacles, and direcdy related to the 
availability of resources for overcoming these obstacles."m This not only confIrms that both Virginia 
and Gray were correct in their papers, but also gave more context to Walker's fIrst proposal. Due to 
the establishment of defInite diffusion facts, Berry and Berry'S article is easily one of the most cited 
research endeavors in the fIeld of policy diffusion. 
While the evaluation of macro-influences were being gauged and discussed, several scholars 
such as John Kingdon and Michael Mintrom took a micro-approach to policy diffusion via the 
importance of policy entrepreneurs. Policy entrepreneurs can be defIned as "people who seek to 
initiate dynamic policy change.,,178 In layman's terms, this comes down to individual politicians, 
grassroots organizations, and lobbying institutions. Both Kingdon and Mintrom arrive at the 
conclusion that policy diffusion absolutely ltinges on the success or failure of these groups in making 
their case to legislatures and the public.l79 Even when controlled across several policies and time, it 
was found that effectiveness of policy innovators is statistically signifIcant. Ignoring them would 
deprive a study of getting the full scope of what is occurring during the moment of policy 
diffusion. ISO 
One interesting method that had not been considered was the notion of examining polices 
that do not get adopted and comparing them to those which do. Craig Volden took tltis approach, 
and his fIndings were quite strong in reaffIrming many central tenets of policy diffusion. Firsdy, he 
noted that polices that do gain national and regional momentum usually have a watershed moment, 
during wltich they gain traction and are adopted by many states in a very short period of time. Those 
177 Berry and Berry 1990 
178 Kingdon 1984 
179 wfintrom 1997 
180 Mintrom et al. 1997 
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that do not typically have a very slow start and tend to lead nowhere. When looking at children's 
health insurance programs, Volden also found that while diffusion does typically occur regionally 
with leaders taking the initiatives fIrst, diffusion occurs most rapidly between states that are located 
geographically close while simultaneously having a similar economic and political makeup. IS! 
The most relevant literature in regard to this research paper comes from Shipan and Volden 
in 2006.182 They were the fIrst to attempt to solely look at AISBs and attempt to explain their 
diffusion across state lines. This work is signifIcant as it identifIes what makes up an AISB and labels 
smoking as a fact-based policy. They also utilized the idea of the watershed moment and were able to 
successfully create a working model of policy diffusion incorporating many of the lessons learned by 
earlier diffusion scholars. These lessons include incorporating regional importance, policy 
entrepreneurs, and several unique models. However, their models missed several key variables, such 
as constituent makeup, and they exanrined the policy when it was still very young. To put in 
perspective, over 20 states have adopted AISBs since 2006, which indicates that the study completely 
missed the rapid watershed phase; in fact, it had only just begun.183 
HYPOTHESES 
My hypotheses for this project reflect the two-stage design explained in the literature review. 
My fIrst hypothesis examines strictly policy adoption. The second looks at those states that as of 
October 2013 already have policies in place, and assesses the rate in which the policies were passed. 
Hi: Having a signifIcant percentage of the population already covered by AISB local ordinances will 
lead to a state adopting a comprehensive AISB. 
H2a: Geographical closeness to leader states will be the leading cause the rate of AISB to increase. 
H2b: Internal state features will be the leading cause of AISB adoptions. 
METHODOLGY 
This research is based on a combination and adaption of the tests administered by Shipan and 
Volden (2006) as well as Berry and Berry (1990). I will examine all 50 states and their adoption of 
AISBs between 1995- September 2013. The fIrst module will be a simple Pearson's r to determine if 
there is any connection at all between the two dependent variables that will be tested, policy adoption 
and rate of adoption. Next a binary logistic regression will be implemented with policy adoption as 
the dependent variable. These results will then be compared with the fmal module, which is an 
ordinary least squares regression with the rate. I observe rate of adoption in terms of simple years 
and do not utilize months, so a policy passed in November 2008 and December of that same year 
will receive the same score of 13 years. 
181 Volden 2006 
182 Shipan and Volden 2006 
183 Ibid. 
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RESEARCH DESIGN 
As stated earlier, this research relies on two different dependent variables and the evaluation 
of both of them to get the full picture of policy diffusion. My fIrst of these variables, Policy 
Adoption, is simply a dummy variable which assigns a 1 to states which have a statewide 
comprehensive AISB. Given consideration to the literature and how similar policies can carry the 
same theme, a state will be evaluated to have an AISB if they have 2/3 of the parts necessary to have 
what is considered a comprehensive smoke-free state: 100 percent smoke-free non-hospitality 
workplaces, 100 percent smoke-free restaurants, and/or 100 percent smoke-free bars184• My second 
dependent variable is named Rate of Adoption. The rate of adoption is the number of years that have 
passed since the fIrst statewide AISB took place in 1995.!85 I am counting the years since the fIrst 
case, not months. Due to the serious chance of data overlap and inconsistency with several other 
independent variables that rely on the date being accurate, I believe simpler is better in this case and 
paints a more accurate picture. 
One of the most critical intervening variables being analyzed is one which captures the 
pressure of local laws and ordinances. Retrieving these data was an arduous task, and was drawn by 
adding up the overall percentage of a state's population already covered by local AISBs in place the 
day that the statewide comprehensive AISB took effect. A chronological table of state and local 
AISB laws!86 along with a percentage chart of U.S. population covered by 100 percent Smoke-Free 
laws were examined, which allowed a Proportion of State Population with Local Restrictions variable 
to be generated.!87 By using multiple data sources, I was able to avoid double counting data for cases 
that might have overlapped (like Sacramento versus Sacramento County laws). If a state does not 
have an AISB in place, I used the percentage as of October 2013. 
The proximity variables were measured by breaking the concept into two parts to capture 
the idea of geographical pressure influencing policy diffusion. First, I looked at regional adoption. I 
did this by dividing the country into 4 semi-homogeneous partitions based off the Census Bureau's 
regional map. The regions used are West (including Hawaii and Alaska), Midwest, South, and 
Northeast. I then counted the number of states in that given region that had an AISB in place when 
the state being examined passed theirs and divide by the total of regional states minus one to account 
for the state itself. This culminates to the production of a Regional Adoption variable. For example, 
Florida would receive a .083 because 1/12 of the other southern states already had a comprehensive 
AISB in place. I implement a similar scheme for the Bordering State Adoption variable as similarly 
184 Americans For Non-S mokers' Rights 2013 
185 Ibid. 
186 Americans For Non-S mokers' Rights 2013 
187 Ibid. 
RE S PUB LIe A [81 
implemented by Shipan and Volden (2006).188 A state receives this score based on the percentage of 
states that share any direct border with the state being examined. This information was collected 
from the Americans for Non-Smokers' Rights interest group. 
To capture internal state governance similarities, I use a variety of variables. First, I 
implement the Legislative Professionalism variable, and use the Squire scale and direcdy place every 
state's 2003 legislative professionalism score into SPSS. Legislative professionalism scores are based 
on a variety of things, such as how many days the general assembly is in session. The result of this 
process is states like California, whose state legislature essentially prepares policymakers for the 
national political scene, receive a higher score than places like Idaho, where the legislature is very 
speed orientated and lawmakers are more lax. Next I use the Congressional Quarterly Political 
Encyclopedia of U.S. States and Regions to look at my Democrat and Republican Unity dummy 
variable. For a state to score a 1, the year their AISB was passed both upper and lower house along 
with the governor must be from the same party. ISO If the state has not passed an AISB, I use October 
2013 as the date to record. I also use a dummy variable I call Historical Preemption, again drawing 
from the Americans for Non-Smokers' Rights database and give a state a 1 if they have had any kind 
of AISB preemption law since 1995, when the fIrst statewide ban took effect until October 2013, the 
cutoff date for my model. Finally, I used the variable Government Ideology to capture government 
preferences, as opposed to constituent ones, because "all else equal, a more liberal government 
prefers a higher level of government activism.,,190 I use the historical state score from Berry et al. 
(2010) to determine the fIgure and use the date of when a state passed an AISB. For those states that 
passed statewide AISBs after 2010, I referred to Richard C. Fording's database, which has the 
updated fIgures until October 2013. For those states who do not have a statewide AISB, I used the 
October 2013 score.l91 
I then turn my attention to the people that comprise the state, and insert several variables 
based on their traits. I use Berry et al.'s citizen ideology score to represent the constituents in a 
stateln I direcdy place this score (from dle year the AISB was placed or October 2013 if none) into 
SPSS and named it Citizen Ideology. I also examine historical median income from the US Census 
Bureau and use a similar measure of entry into SPPS, again using the dates an AISB was in place (or 
October 2013 if none) I call this variable Median Income.l93 
188 Shipan and Volden 2006 
189 Winkler 2008 
190 Volden 2006 
191 Fording 2013 
192 Berry and Berry 1990 
193 US Census Bureau 2013 
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Tobacco usage and production must also be considered when looking at anything related to 
anti-smoking. I used historical smoking rates from when a state passed an AISB or 2013 if AISBs 
were not present. I obtained this information from the American Lung Association. I named the 
created variable Smoker Percentage. To capture the idea of a tobacco producing state and the 
ramifications, I use a dummy variable called Tobacco Producing State, and give a 1 to those states 
which grow or produce tobacco products and 0 to those who do not. 
Finally I construct two opposite variables which examine lobbyist influence in a state and 
name them Tobacco 1.JJbby Percentage and Health 1.JJbby Percentage. The figures are taken from a 1996 
snapshot study conducted by Goldstein and Bearman. The measure is "a ratio of the number of 
health (or tobacco) lobbyists in the state to the total number of registered lobbyists present.,,194 
Together I believe these variables accurately reflect the many scholars who wrote diffusion literature 
recommend as a "comprehensive analysis of policy diffusion," and truly capture the whole picture of 
what is happening in statewide comprehensive anti-indoor smoking bans. 
RESULTS 
Table 1: Pearson's r correlation 
Policy Years 
Policy & Median income (-.369**) Years & Percent Region (.689**) 
Policy & South (-.646**) Years & Percent Touch (.439**) 
Policy & Citizen ID (.564**) Years & Uni. Republicans (-.351*) 
Policy & T. Producing State (-.305*) Years & Percent Smokers (.632**) 
Policy & Percent Smokers (-.444*) **-.05 *-.01 
Table 1 is the statistically significant Pearson's r correlations between the two dependent 
variables in the equation. Between both simple policy adoption and adoption rate, the only common 
correlation between the two was Percent Smokers. It has a negative correlation at -.444 and was 
statistically significant at the .05 level for policy adoption, meaning more smokers will lead to less of a 
chance for an AISB to be in place in that state. For adoption rate, Percent Smokers had a positive 
correlation of .632 and was actually significant at the .01 level. Other statistically significant adoption 
rate correlations included median income, south, citizen ideology, and if the state is a tobacco­
producing one. Adoption rate correlations appeared to be based along geographical lines, with both 
my proximity variables of regional adoption and direct border state adoption variables were 
statistically significant at the .01 level. To no one's surprise, there was a negative correlation between 
unified republicans and the adoption rate of AISBs. Most notably absent from both policy and years 
were the variables Unified Democrats and Government Ideology, which in this early test might signal 
that in this particular policy, constituent makeup matters more than governmental. 
194 Goldstein and Bearman 1996 
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Table 2: Binary logistic regression of simple policy adoption 
Model Exp(B) Sig. 
Constant .009 .25 
Municipality .928 .049* 
Professionalism 1.03 .679 
Unified Republicans .102 .234 
Unified Democrats 6.85 .293 
Citizen Ideology 1.215 .015* 
Government Ideology .938 .110 
Tobacco Producer .90 .066 
Preemption History 1.470 .836 
Median Income 1.056 .593 
R2 - .735 
Table 2 represents my first stage of policy diffusion. The dependent variable in this binary 
logistic regression was whether or not a state simply had a comprehensive AISB or not. The R2 was 
.735, which allows us to say that the model explains 73.5 percent of the variance in the dependent 
variable. Of the variables listed above, only the percentage of state covered by local ordinances and 
citizen ideology were statistically significant at the .05 level (.049 and .015 respectively). 
Professionalism, unified democrats and republicans, government ideology, if the state was a 
tobacco producer, preemption of AISBs, and median income were all statistically insignificant. These 
initial findings appear to be in line with what other researchers have found to be primary 
determinants of policy diffusion but with several key exceptions. All of the factors which represent 
state-level influences, such as government ideology and unified legislatures played zero role in 
determining the passage of a statewide AISB. The influence of municipality passage also appears to 
have diminished since Shipan and Volden's similar endeavor in 2006, which across the board found 
.01 significance level, most notably with local ordinances. 
841RES PUBLICA 
T hi 3 OLS a e : regresslOn 0 : po c a optlon rates. f li d 
Model T-Score 
Constant .992 
Municipality 1.072 
Percent Region 2.372 
Percent Touching .377 
Professionalism -1.904 
Median Income -.344 
Unified Republican -.643 
Unified Democrat 1.016 
South 1.687 
Preemption -2.12 
Citizen Ideology -.207 
Government Ideology -.274 
Tobacco Producer .864 
Percentage Smokers .869 
Tobacco Lobby -.51 
Health Lobby 1.711 
R2 - .765 
Sig. 
.333 
.296 
.028* 
.71 
.071 
.735 
.527 
.322 
.107 
.047* 
.838 
.787 
.398 
.395 
.615 
.100 
Std. Error of the Ewmate - 2.165 
Table 3 is the second step in analyzing policy diffusion, this time using rate of adoption with 
those states which have an AISB in place as the dependent variable. To calculate this, a filter was 
implemented to only look at states that registered policy = 1 on SPSS, resulting in an N of 36. Again, 
a high R2 was observed, specifically .765, which gives a high amount of confidence. Surprisingly, this 
time the percentage of citizens with a local ordinance and citizen ideology were not statistically 
significant. This time municipality had a causal effect of .296 and citizen ideology was observed at 
.838. What was statistically significant, however, was the percentage of states already with an AISB in 
place when the case state adopted, along with a negative correlation with states that have had a 
history of AISB preemption laws in place. Again, unified Democrats and Republicans did not come 
up as statistically significant and were observed at .322 and .527 respectively. Surprisingly, the 
variables for Tobacco and Health Lobby both were not statistically significant, with the former 
coming in at .615 and the latter at .102. Percentage smokers and tobacco being produced in a state 
both were also statistically insignificant despite the percentage of state smokers being so strongly 
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related in the last model that it had to be removed. The percentage of smokers in a state was only 
.395 and production was .615. During this step of the evaluation of AISBs, regionalism percentage 
and history of preemption laws were statistically sigoificant at the .05 level, with regionalism at .028 
and preemption .047. Although the regionalism score was sigoificant, the bordering score was not. 
This is noteworthy because it implies that the defmition of state neighbors must be expanded to 
include more than those states which share a direct border. 
Figure 1: A frequency table of state adoption rates 
m !l.ln ?.no am fI� IrJ.Q!l n.oo l:l.oo 13m 1.':.00 15.00 nJD 
'if6;))" 
I included this figure to again reaffIrm Volden's hypothesis that a watershed moment exists 
where a policy will rapidly diffuse and gain national momentum causing late adopters, or "followers" 
such as Wisconsin, to adopt a specific policy.l95 2005-2009 appears to be that time period, as there 
was an explosion of diffusion that as of 2013 has appeared to have completely dissipated. Finally, it 
can be inferred through this observation that the states that have not yet adopted (the majority of 
them being in the south) will never do so given the current influencers both inside and around their 
state. 
CONCLUSION 
My initial hypotheses for my two-step approach to policy diffusion were only partially 
conHrmed. For simple policy adoption, having a larger percentage of people already covered by local 
ordinances was statistically sigoiHcant, but that was only when coupled with several other distinct 
variables. As mentioned above, placing the variable of historical smoker population percentages 
completely skewed the results. On top of that, the sigoiHcance level was only .049. If any other 
southern state were to adopt a comprehensive AISB, I imagine that local pressure would no longer 
become statistically sigoiHcant. I was also incorrect about having a multitude of underlying state 
195 Volden 2006 
86 IRE S PUB Lie A 
features affecting adoption. All of my other variables attempting to control for government 
preference and capacity fell flat. I do know however (due to my Pearson's r correlation) that there is a 
lot more going on with adoption of AISBs, as median income, being a southern state, and citizen 
ideology all were significant at the .01 level. Perhaps future researchers can construct more focused 
regressions to figure out what I am missing and account for the lost variables. 
My evaluation of statewide AISB adoption rates yielded similar contradictions with my 
hypotheses and data. I was correct in my estimate that geographical proximity would play a key patt 
in determining policy diffusion, but I expected a state sharing a direct border with an AISB state 
would be more significant than regionalism percentage. The opposite actually occurred, with 
regionalism having a significance rate of .028 and sharing a direct border only being .71. Again it 
appeared that state legislature makeup had no effect on policy diffusion at the state level. The only 
other factor that was actually significant at the .05 level was having a history of AISB preemption, 
which therefore likely threw off the municipality numbers because it was illegal for local governments 
to have them. Based on my Pearson's r correlation between adoption rates and percentage of a state's 
smoking population being .632, I strongly expected that result to shine through in my OLS 
regression. Seeing another lost variable, I ran another regression with just variables significant at the 
.1 level and nothing carne back as statistically significant. This therefore reaffirmed Berry and Berry's 
1990 conclusion that for policy diffusion to be analyzed, there needs to be a multitude of 
independent variables. Comparing the two independent variables' results show that many different 
forces are at play when polices diffuse, and ignoring a two-step procedure leaves out much of the 
story. 
According to my frequency chart, policy diffusion for statewide comprehensive anti-indoor 
smoking bans appears to be at its end. Unfortunately for this study, federal influence on this policy 
did not begin until September 2013, with a national ad campaign from the Center for Disease 
Control (CDC) aimed at curbing tobacco usage called "Tips from Former Smokers.,,!96 The full 
impact of this new federal initiative has not been recorded on states that do not have a 
comprehensive AISB and it is likely that it might tip the scale toward adopting legislation. This 
research can therefore be interpreted as the result of state and local government, as the diffusion is 
appears to be largely completed. In the coming months when such federal spending can be coded, 
future researchers can use this document to provide insight on how to explain policy diffusion. 
196 Center for Disease Control and Prevention 2013 
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CURIOSITY OR MANNERS: 
THE VALUES THAT SHAPE AMERICAN POLITICAL MINDSETS 
Ryan Winter 
Abstract: In the late 1990s, political analyst and lingnist George Lakoffproposed an intrigning new IVqy to 
nnderstand what sepamtes liberals from cOllseroatives in A111C1ican politics. His theory Ivas based on the prenlise that 
there are I1vo opposingfra111es thlvtlgh Ivhich Americans vielv politics, alld that parentillg val lies deter111ine Ivhich fra111e 
one chooses. Those Ivho adhere to the strict father mode! hold consemative belieft on a Ivide range of isslles, Ivhile 
11fotnmnt parents are more liberaL Lakoffs Ivritings have sillce become Ividespread alld his parenting theory has 
cOllvillced mallY political strategists and activists, despite the fact that his hypotheses lacked empirical evidence. This 
st1lqy 1Ised Stllvry data to test the ittspact of pmmtillg valt/es 011 a wide range of controversial policies. It finds strollg 
s1lpp011 for the hypotheses that smct fathers tend to prefor stronger securi!y measures and stfPP011 tmditiollal social 
norms, 1vhile t1tlrlllrtlllt parmls are more h'beral on these isslles. HOJJJever, parenting style proved to be a poor indicator 
of political affit1ldes on the govemmC1lt's role ill the eCOIl011I)1. 
INTRODUCTION 
On September 20th of 2004, millions of Americans turned on their teb�sions to watch the 
first presidential debate between George W. Bush and John Kerry. On issues ranging from foreign 
policy to social problems to financial matters, the candidates clashed at every turn. Then, during one 
of Kerry's responses, Bush made a very strange comment. It was such a small, unremarkable moment 
that most people have now forgotten it. However, if one were to believe the writings of cognitive 
scientist George Lakoff, Bush's remark and Kerry's response perfectly explains the vast differences 
between two men representing political polar opposites. 
John Kerry was in the middle of complimenting the president and his family on how well 
they handled the considerable pressure of living in the White House. Kerry began to joke about the 
Bush daughters, "I've chuckled a few times at some of their comments/' but Bush interrupted. " I'm 
trying to put a leash on them," he said, to which Kerry immediately replied, "Well I don't know, I've 
learned not to do that." The audience laughed appreciatively for both candidates, and the debate 
continued. While this brief interchange might appear no more than a slight disagreement in parenting 
techniques, Lakoff believes it is the ultimate key to understanding why some people are liberals and 
others are conservatives. 
LAKOFF'STHEORY 
It was during the 1990s that Lakoff began to wonder where people got their political 
attitudes from. Specifically, he was interested in why the two dominant political ideologies in America 
stood opposed on so many seemingly unrelated issues. " The question I asked myself," he recalls, 
"was this: What do the conservatives' positions on issues have to do with each other?"197 What does 
being against gun control have to do with opposing gay marriage? Why should a person's opinions 
on foreign policy correspond to a particular stance on tile environment, and what does abortion have 
197 Lakoff 2004 
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to do with welfare spending? Is there some natural connection that explains the organization of these 
beliefs, or are they just historical remnants of coalition building?!98 These questions had been asked 
before, but Lakoff's answer was a completely new one that captured the imagination of his readers. 
In his earlier work, Lakoff argued that people construct political opinions on the basis of their moral 
identity.!99 For example, if one were to ask the average American to explain why abortion should be 
legal or illegal, they might give facts and figures to back up their position, but in the end it comes 
down to wbat feels right, a fundamental and unchangeable belief that abortion is either morally 
acceptable or unacceptable. There are two opposing frames through which Americans view the world 
of politics, Lakoff says. One frame is associated with liberal beliefs and the other with conservative. 
One missing piece remained in his theory: Lakoff had not yet explained the logic holding these 
frames together. 
It is obvious that liberals and conservatives view the world differendy; the real question is 
why. The incessant use of the phrase "family values" by conservative politicians first gave Lakoff the 
idea that perhaps the two opposing political frames in this country result from two opposing 
conceptions of the family. Because families occupy such a core part of life, it seems reasonable to 
infer that parenting values could function as a heuristic for more complex issues, including politics. 
His hypothesis, as another team of researchers succinctly summarized, was that "As people 
normatively understand proper relations between parents and children, so will they envision proper 
relations between government and its citizens."200 Consequently, the two frames underlying political 
identity correspond to two different styles of parenting: on the one hand the nurturant parent, and 
on the other the strict father.2°1 
The Strict Father 
The strict father mentality is one that most people will recognize immediately. It starts with 
the assumption that humans are naturally flawed and want to do what feels good, not what is right. 
Children must to be taught right from wrong by a loving but stern authority figure-the father. The 
world is competitive, but those who work hard and stand by their morals will rise to the top.202 
Children must be corrected if they disobey their parents or resist learning discipline. Often, they must 
be spanked for their own good, because punishment will keep them from making mistakes again. For 
strict fathers, all kinds of social ills and perversions can be attributed to permissive parenting 
practices. They believe that those who deviate from traditional lifestyles, commit violent crime, or 
198 Barker and Tinnik 2006, 249 
199 Lakoff 1996 
200 Barker and Tinnik 2006, 259 
201 Both men and women can technically be "strict father" types, as long as they agree with its overall outlook. 
In fact, this study finds that women are actually slightly more likely than men to identify with the strict father 
model. 
202 Lakoff 2004 
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rely on government assistance were never disciplined as children and never learned to be responsible 
adults.203 
The political implications of such a mindset follow logically. Strict parents oppose taxing big 
business and wealthy business owners because they are doing their part and contributing to the 
economy. Government "handouts" and other programs that promote equality only encourage 
laziness and do not teach people responsibility. Lakoff argues that the strict parent's focus on 
punishment as a correctional measure, along with the belief in absolute good and evil, explains why 
conservatives insist on a tough stance on crime and a strong military.204 
The Nlllillrant Parent 
Nurturant parents take a more interdependent view of the world, valuing egalitarianism and 
tolerance of other moral standards. While the strict father model presupposes a traditional family, the 
nurturant parent is gender-neutral and can be found in a traditional family, a single-parent family, or 
even same-sex relationships.2os If there are two parents, they share the responsibility of raising and 
disciplining the child, which they believe is born good and can be made better through nurturance. 
The utmost goal is for the child to live a happy, fulfilled life so that it can grow up to nurture others 
and make the world a better place. Lakoff thinks that parents who fall closer to the nurturant end of 
the spectrum are more likely to have the values of tolerance and empathy accessible when they think 
about politics.2OO If he is right in guessing that nurturance underlies American liberalism, it would 
certainly explain much of the Democraric Party's current platform, including universal healthcare, 
raising the minimum wage, workers' rights, and more. On issues from gay marriage to social policy to 
foreign policy, the nurturant parent oudook leads logically to the opposite conclusions of the strict 
father. 
Implications 
If Lakoff's theory is correct, it could have enormously significant consequences for 
politicians, campaigns, and researchers. Lakoff suggests that partisans can use parenting metaphors to 
harness the potential of undecided and independent voters, by far the most vital slice of the 
electorate. Since nonpartisans do not use one of the two parenting models but rather a mix 
depending on the situation, Lakoff argues that candidates of either party can activate the middle 
through careful word choice and by framing the political debate in ways that remind voters of their 
parenting values.207 Apart from influencing elections and public opinion, Lakoff's model could be a 
203 Lakoff 1996, 197 
204 Lakoff 2004 
205 Ibid. 
206 Ibid. 
207 Lakoff 2004 
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very useful tool for political scientists. If he is right, it would be possible to predict people's feelings 
on a wide range of political issues simply by asking them a few questions about parenting. 
While his insights certainly contributed a creative new take on the origins of ideological 
constraint, Lakoffs model lacked systematic data to back it up. He relied primarily on the face-value 
plausibility of his parenting theory, without offering scientific evidence. Therefore, a study testing the 
reliability of the parenting theory provides much-needed quantitative research on a topic that could 
have major repercussions for the ways political scientists think about ideological constraint. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Other researchers have designed experiments to test the parenting proposal, but for the 
most part these have been contradictory or inconclusive. Analyses of survey data from 2000 revealed 
that "the stronger one's views regarding childrearing-either in terms of nurturance or disdpline­
the more consistently liberal or conservative one's political attitudes tend to be,"2o, a finding that 
offers robust support to Lakoffs claims. Archival research, too, has revealed a correlation between 
statewide attitudes towards punishing children and presidential vote. As a general rule, red states 
approve of corporal punishment while blue states do not. In their book AlltboritarianisJJI and 
Poimization in American Politics, Heatherington and Weiler describe a positive relationship between the 
percentage of a state's population that voted for Bush in 2004 and the share of parents who 
approved of using physical punishment to discipline children. At the top were Idaho, Wyoming, and 
Oklahoma, all of which voted nearly seventy percent for Bush, and where about sixty percent of 
parents approved of using physical punishment. At the other end were Massachusetts, Vermont, 
Rhode Island, and New York, with the lowest rates of Bush voters and corporal punishment.2OO 
While useful for highlighting trends, this type of data can only show correlations, not underlying 
causes. Heatherington and Welier cannot conclude from these data that parenting attitudes canse 
worldviews. It might be that some other variable causes both strict parenting and Republican voting. 
The correlation between the two could well be spurious. Nonetheless, these statewide trends 
certainly bolster the authority of Lakoffs model. 
Other researchers are more hesitant to accept the parenting hypothesis. In one creative 
experiment, linguist Alan Cienki studied presidential candidates' use of strict or nurturant expressions 
in presidential debates. He concluded that Al Gore was more likely to use nurturant language or 
gestures than George W. Bush, but the overall occurrence of such metaphors was extremely low. If 
parenting indeed represents the underlying frame through which all of politics is understood, it 
should have shown up more frequently in these important political talks. Another researcher testing 
208 Barker and Tinnick 2006 
209Heatherington and Weiler 2009, 2 
RES PUBLICA 193 
Lakoffs conclusions stopped short of ever testing for ideological constraint.210 Postlewait interpreted 
Lakoffs writing to mean that there should be two distinct camps of parents, with few people 
remaining in the middle. When she discovered that in reality parenting styles more closely resembled 
a normal distribution, she concluded that the results did not fit with Lakoffs depiction of two 
"radically opposed" styles.2!1 However, Lakoff does not claim that that all people are either one type 
of parent or the other. In fact, he says there is a range of parenting styles and that the majority of 
people alternate between strict and nurturant styles depending on the situation. For these reasons, 
Postlewait's conclusion was shortsighted. Liberals and conservatives make up only a small portion of 
the population, so why should parenting purists be the majority? In fact, the finding that most 
parents fall in between strictness and nurturance only increases the importance for politicians to 
understand these frames. A liberal candidate running for office will have already locked down the 
vote of nurturant parents, but needs to figure out how to speak to and convince the swing voters in 
the middle, who use both frames and respond to both. This is where the political battle takes place, 
so understanding how to connect with these voters is essential. 
HYPOTHESES 
For the purpose of testing, Lakoffs theory has been broken into two smaller hypotheses. To 
pass the initial test of validity, the independent variable of parenting style must accurately predict 
broad political attitudes, such as party identification, ideology, and presidential vote. If it cannot, then 
Lakoff will have a hard time convincing others of his theory's reliability. 
Hl: Strict fathers will be more likely than nurturant parents to identify as 
Republicans, to identify as conservatives, and to vote for Romney in 2012. 
Later on, more focused hypotheses will test parenting style's relationship towards specific policies, 
but the foundation of Lakoffs theory rests on the assumption that people instinctively access their 
parenting values to interpret the political world. If nurturant parents are no more likely than strict 
fathers to call themselves Democrats or Republicans, conservatives or liberals, then Lakoffs theory 
will have been dealt a fatal blow and it will hardly be worthwhile to continue the study. 
After testing for broad political identities, I proceed to test Lakoffs assertion that parenting 
styles tie together the diverse coalition of ideas that comprise liberal and conservative worIdviews. 
Again, my independent variable was parenting style and I tested for sixteen different dependent 
variables on as many controversial political topics as possible. Studying these attitudes separately will 
enable comparison of which types of political views, if any, parenting can predict. For ease of 
interpretation these sixteen issues have been categorized into three groups: security, traditional 
values, and desire for equality. 
210 Postlewait 2006 
211 Lakoff 1996, 35 
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H2a: Strict fathers will show more support than nurturant parents for defense and 
security issues. 
Because strict fathers view the world as a dark and dangerous place, they are expected to favor 
vigorous law enforcement and a strong military. It also seems logical to expect that strict father types 
would be less trusting of others in general. Nurturant parents decidedly disagree. Five political 
attitudes dealing with security were measured, including federal defense spending, crime spending, 
the death penalty, gun control, and social trust. 
H2b: Strict fathers will be more likely to approve of traditional family roles and 
socially conservative values than nurturant parents. 
Recall that nurturant parents teach their children to be more tolerant and accepting of diversity, 
whereas strict fathers are likely to think that others should live by traditional roles and the customs of 
their own parents. Again, five attitudes-feelings about abortion, gay marriage, traditional gender 
roles, environmental protection, and white privilege-were tested to determine the influence of 
parenting. Lakoffs theory will only be strengthened if nurturant parents choose the more tolerant or 
liberal option. 
The last group of issues dealt with the role and scope of the government and the extent to 
which it should be involved in promoting equality. Naturally, strict parents are expected to prefer a 
small government, allowing those who have learned discipline to flourish without interference. 
Nurturant parents, however, see the welfare state as essential to helping people back on their feet so 
they can become self-sufficient and give back to a society that cares for its citizens. 
H1c: Nurturant parents will be more likely than strict fathers to endorse 
government intervention to promote equaliry. 
Altogether, six attitudes were measured that correspond to views on equality, including feelings about 
government involvement in the economy, universal healthcare, welfare spending, size of government, 
affirmative action, and a general measure of the importance of having an equal society. 
If parenting philosophy fails to consistently predict views on all of these topics, or if it only 
predicts views on one or two out of the three categories, then I have failed to fmd support for 
Lakoffs theory. If, after controlling for extraneous variables, parenting remains a strong predictor of 
all these political views, then substantial support will be given to the parenting theory put forward by 
Lakoff, lending a more systematic form of credibility to his anecdotal evidence 
DESIGN AND MEASUREMENT 
Operationalization of Variables 
For all the necessary variables and controls in this study, data was drawn from the most 
recent American National Election Study CANES), conducted at the time of the 2012 election. To 
operationalize the chief independent variable, parenting style, four questions were chosen from the 
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dataset that directly measured the nurturant/ strict cleavage. For each question, respondents were 
offered two possible traits, one nurturant and one strict, and were asked to choose which they 
considered preferable for children have. The choices included "independence or respect for elders"; 
"curiosity or good manners"; "obedience or self-reliance"; and "considerate or well-behaved." 
Nurturant responses received zeroes and strict responses ones. The resulting scale, which is labeled 
in the data as "parent score," ran from zero to fOUf, with higher scores indicating a stricter parenting 
style. Unfortunately, the ANES 2012 did not ask for respondents' opinions on the use of corporal 
punishment to discipline children, one of Lakoffs major distinctions between the two styles. Despite 
this omission, the parent score should provide a very good measure of the two frames Lakoff 
described. As Table 1 illustrates, the questions did not intercorrelate as highly as might be expected. 
However, Lakoff predicted most people to fall somewhere in the middle of the scale because most 
people are not strong liberals or conservatives and would therefore employ both models in everyday 
life. Each individual question correlated highly with the scale as a whole, and the removal of any 
single question did not significantly alter the findings of this research. The most common score was a 
three out of fouf, meaning the average American is more strict than nurturant, a result consistent 
with other studies of authoritarianism among the American population.212 
T bi 1 C a e : I ·  M orre atIOn 1 atnx 0 fP arentm I d n ex an dI d· ·d alP n lV1 u arentlng Q uestlons 
Independence/ Curiosity/ Obedience/ Considerate/ 
Respect Elders Manners Self-Reliance Well-Behaved 
Independence/ 1 
Respect Elders 
Curiosity/ .331** 1 
Manners 
Obedience/ .326** .350** 1 
Self-Reliance 
Considerate/ . 133** .282** .264** 1 
Well-Behaved 
Parent Score .624** .716** .729** .641 ** 
Note: One asterIsk denotes slgruficance at the .05 level, two asterIsks at the .001 level 
ANES data were also used to measure the dependent variables. The survey included 
questions that dealt with all sLxteen issues mentioned in the hypotheses, as well as sociodemographics 
and other extraneous variables for which social scientists routinely contro1.213 Because race has well­
known effects on American political identity, and because some of the dependent vatiables such as 
212 Heatherington and Weiler 2009 
213 These included age (measured by group), gender (men were coded as zeroes, women as ones; therefore a 
positive relationship with "gender" actually indicates that females were likely to hold that particular attitude), 
education level (five categories were included, and a higher score indicated more years of education), and 
annual income (measured in 28 categories ranging from under $5000 to over $250,000, a higher score indicates 
a higher annual income). 
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affirmative action and white privilege dealt directly with radal issues, two dummy variables, white and 
black, controlled for race. Religion has also been shown to correlate with political beliefs, notably 
abortion and gay marriage, so a scale that combined two dimensions of religious behavior was 
created. Frequency of attendance at religious services and frequency of private religious practice were 
combined into an overall religiosity score. Last, party identification was measured in the form of a 
seven-point scale from strong Democrat to strong Republican, and another seven-point scale 
measured ideological self-placement from strong liberal to strong conservative. On both of these two 
indicators, the more right-wing answers were coded as higher. It should be noted that party ID and 
ideology were almost always controls and were therefore categorized as independent variables. 
However, hypothesis one required testing of these as dependent variables. When party ID was a 
dependent variable, ideology was still controlled for and vice versa. 
Testing the Relationships 
Each dependent variable was tested separately. For most of these, ordinary least squares 
regression was employed to determine the relative strengrh of parenting and all of the other 
sododemographic and control variables. However, three of the dependent variables only had two 
possible outcomes. For vote for president, size of government, and role of government in the 
economy, binary logistic regression was used instead of OLS.214 The results of the regression models 
allow us to see which factors are significant predictors for each of the nineteen separate dependent 
variables. When the parenting index receives a high T-score that means it is a good independent 
predictor of people's views towards that issue. 
214 For size of government, respondents were asked to choose from "the less government, the better," or 
"there are more things that government should be doing." For government's role in the economy, respondents 
were read: "One, we need a strong government to handle today's complex economic problems; or two, the free 
market can handle these problems without government being involved." 
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RESULTS 
Table 2: Political Identities 
Party ID Ideology Presidential Vote 
(binary) 
Beta T Beta T Exp (B) 
Parenting Score .002 .164 .120 9.734** 1.159* 
Age -.050 -4.563** .061 5.370** 1.037 
Gender -.041 -3.697** -.030 -2.614* 1.138 
Education .044 3.563** -.044 -3.463** .912 
Income .052 4.326** .004 .314 1.015 
Party ID -- -- .606 48.958** 2.563** 
Ideology .574 48.958** -- -- 2.339** 
Religiosity .048 4.024** .137 11.301 ** 1.083* 
White .103 5.950** .002 .094 1.664 
Black -.183 -10.588** .019 1.054 .055** 
C onstant -- -.955 -- 10.717 .000 
R Square .477 .448 .799 (Nagelkerke R 
Square) 
Note: One astensk denotes slgruficance at the .05 level, two astensks at the .0011evel 
The higher the T-score, the stronger the predictive power of that variable. A negative T-scorc indicates a 
negative causal influence of that variable on the political attitude. 
An Exp (B) that exceeds one denotes a positive relationship, while less than one denotes a negative 
relationship. 
As Lakoff predicted, nurturant parents were much more likely to self-identify as liberal, even 
after controlling for party ID and other variables, while strict fathers were more often conservative. 
This relationship is statistically significant at the .001 level, and in fact proved to be one of the best 
predictors of how people defined their ideology, surpassing education, income, gender, and age. In 
fact, only party ID and religiosity showed stronger predictive power. However, looking as an 
independent predictor of party ID, parenting performed much worse than it did for ideology. This 
finding should not be mistaken as an assertion that nurturant parents are unlikely to be Democrats, 
because bivariate correlations show that they are. Instead, the regression model reveals that nurturant 
attitudes do not cause people to become Democrats. The variance in partisanship is instead explained 
by other factors, notably ideology and race. 
Finally, the parenting effect was tested for presidential vote. Here, the relationship is small 
but significant at the .05 level. Even after holding party ID, ideology, and all other contaminating 
variables constant, nurturant parents were significantly more likely to cast a ballot for Obama than 
strict parents, who favored Romney. Despite the immense amount of attention focused on the 
notorious gender gap and the media's coverage of Romney's personal wealth, gender and income 
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were still eclipsed by the predictive power of parenting. At the theoretical level it appears that Lakoff 
was on to something, but examining the issues in closer detail will reveal the true influence of 
parenting on today's most controversial political debates. 
H)pothesis 2 a: 5 eemity 
T hI 3 S a e : eCU!1ty 
Defense Crime Spending Death Penalty Gun Control Social Trust 
Spending 
Beta T Beta T Beta T Beta T 
Parentin .104 6.479** .156 9.595** .177 11.336** .001 .041 
g Score 
Age .070 4.834** .046 3.107* .014 1.002 .061 4.346** 
Gender .019 1.329 .047 3.150* -.031 -2.158* .149 10.665** 
Educatio -.101 -6.233** -.066 1-3.979** -.062 -3.915** .043 2.751* 
n 
Income .003 .219 -.029 -1.829 .040 2.570* .028 1.821 
Party ID .167 8.356** -.078 -3.887** .155 8.052** -.248 -13.125** 
Ideology .212 10.864** -.013 -.671 .138 7.403** -.138 -7.500** 
Religiosity .016 .995 .039 2.433* -.159 -10.348** .012 .786 
White -.022 -.987 -.043 -1.858 .057 2.549* -.064 -2.896* 
Black .019 .851 .022 .927 -.039 -1.737 -.018 -.834 
Constant -- 10.402 -- 35.748 -- 9.286 -- 25.406 
R Square .169 .069 .144 .163 
Note: One asterlsk denotes slgruficance at the .05 level, two asterIsks at the .001 level 
The higher the T-score, the stronger the predictive power of that variable. A negative T-score indicates a 
negative causal influence of that variable on the political attitude. 
Beta 
-.139 
.083 
-.007 
.144 
.119 
.060 
-.025 
.056 
.098 
-.074 
--
The regression results for predicting distrust of others and the related desire for increased 
security were astounding. As indicated in Table 3, parenting emerged as one of the strongest, if not 
the best, predictor of attitudes on nearly every issue. Often, parenting's independent effect even 
surpassed the giants of party ID and ideology. Strict parents heavily favored increasing the defense 
budget; in fact, only party ID and ideology better predicted views towards defense spending. 
Parenting index actually proved to be the strongest predictor of views on the death penalty and crime 
spending, an extremely promising result for Lakoff, and after education, parenting proved to be the 
best predictor for social trust. The one exception was gun control, where parenting had almost no 
effect at all. One possible response to this anomaly is that for gun control, either side could 
technically be viewed as a security issue. For some people, gun access is vital to protecting their 
family from a hostile world. For others, there are many evil people in this hostile world who should 
not be able to get their hands on a gun. And yet most Americans recognize that there is a clear 
conservative and liberal side to the issue of gun control. Either Lakoffs model must be elaborated to 
T 
-8.993** 
5.914** 
-.494 
9.122** 
7.798** 
3.150* 
-1.376 
3.667** 
4.446** 
-3.294** 
23.913 
.150 
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explain this discrepancy, or it must acknowledge that it simply cannot predict attitudes towards gun 
resrrictions.2l5 Overall, these results substantially srrengthen Lakoffs hypothesis; strict parents 
trusted others less and were willing to spend more to ensure their security. 
Hypothesis 2b: Traditiollal Sodal Vallies 
Table 4' Traditional Social Issues 
Gay Marriage Abortion Gender Roles Environment White Privilege 
Beta T Beta T Beta T Beta T Beta T 
Parenting -.158 - -.111 -8.074** .112 7.115** -.042 -2.852* .199 13.550** 
Score 11.476** 
Age �.091 -7.246** .039 3.130* .121 8.411** -.052 -3.933** -.054 -4.013** 
Gender .073 5.850** .055 4.359** -.062 -4.323** .026 1.932 -.043 -3.190** 
Education .078 5.597** .066 4.696** -.079 -4.938** -.007 -.464 -.169 -
11.366** 
Income .000 -.010 .049 3.627** .023 1.466 -.045 -3.156* -.023 -1.558 
Party ID -.148 -8.760** -.122 -7.234** .046 2.381 * -.256 - .151 8.363** 
14.281** 
Ideology -.215 - -.227 - .137 7.215** -.257 - .165 9.401** 
13.024** 13.791** 14.784** 
Religiosity -.277 - -.348 - .119 7.603** .014 .979 -.039 -2.717* 
20.414** 25.625** 
White .060 3.064* .000 .023 -.018 -.792 -.044 -2.124* .000 -.021 
Black -.018 -.895 .088 4.453** -.043 -1.874 .006 .279 -.194 -9.180** 
Constant -- 39.928 -- 26.643 -- 9.631 -- 51.265 -- 14.895 
R Square .330 .333 .117 .250 .238 
Lakoffs model was again srrongly supported on attirudes ranging from abortion to white 
privilege. Table 4 exhibits the absolutely immense influence of parenting style on acceptance of gays 
and lesbians. For homosexual marriage, parenting style surpassed age and even party ID; only 
religiosity and ideology performed better on this issue. On abortion, the T -score of over eight shows 
a high association between nurturance and pro-choice attitudes, and once again the only better 
predictors were religiosity and ideology. When asked whether it would harm the family for a woman 
to work outside of the home, strict fathers showed startlingly high preferences for rraditional gender 
roles. While environmental issues may not have revealed the same level of predictive power as other 
issues, here too Lakoffs hypothesis was supported. It appears that nurturant artitudes towards 
children rranslate into environmental protection, a finding statistically significant at the .05 level. 
Where parenting style really stood out was on measures of white privilege, or the ability of 
members of the majority race to ignore historical and institutional prejudices that maintain racial 
215 Interestingly, gun control was the only security issue where gender played such a major role. Women were 
much more likely to think it should be more difficult to buy a gun. 
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inequality. This variable was measured by asking respondents how strongly they agreed or disagreed 
with the statement, "It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only 
try harder they could be just as well off as whites." After controlling for a multitude of intervening 
variables, parenting stood out as the most significant variable measured, with a T-score of over 
thirteen. For white privilege, parenting is more important than whether one is black or white. 
Education represents the second strongest individual predictor, with increases in education resulting 
in drastically reduced white privilege. Returning to Lakoffs theory, we can observe that it is clearly 
borne out on all social issues measured. 
Hypothesis 2c: Eql/ality 
Table 5: Independence versus Interdependence (OLS Reg ession) 
Equality Healthcare Welfare Afftrmative Action 
Beta T Beta T Beta T Beta T 
Parenting -.084 -5.667** -.042 -3.392** -.067 -4.573** -.096 -6.250** 
Score 
Age -.009 -.683 .001 .107 -.002 -.140 .003 .211 
Gender .001 .063 .020 1.755 .023 1.692 -.016 -1.179 
Education .045 3.023* .035 2.787* -.053 -3.538** .064 4.093** 
Income -.003 -.179 .023 1.914 -.161 -11.118** -.044 -2.885* 
Party ID -.180 -9.919** -.446 -29.462** -.203 -11.310** -.240 -12.755** 
Ideology -.265 -15.002** -.253 -17.182** -.231 -13.192** -.151 -8.233** 
Religiosity .009 .635 .020 1.637 .041 2.864* .070 4.632** 
White -.033 -1.569 -.042 -2.376* -.036 -1.740 -.012 -.554 
Black .104 4.880** .080 4.511** .073 3.481 ** .241 10.829** 
Constant -- 32.112 -- 33.540 -- 47.052 -- 21.979 
R Square .226 .467 .244 .262 
Note: One astensk denotes slgruficance at the .05 level, two astensks at the .001 level. 
The higher the T-score, the stronger the predictive power of that variable. A negative T -score indicates a 
negative causal influence of that variable on the political attitude. 
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Table 6: Independence versus Interdependence :Binary Logistic Regression) 
Big Government Free Market 
Exp (B) Exp (B) 
Parenting Score 1.097* .952 
Age .959** 1.000 
Gender 1.316** .711** 
Education .913* 1.056 
Income .983** .993 
Party ID .696** 1.453** 
Ideology .704** 1.505** 
Religiosity 1.035* .960* 
White .675* 1.362* 
Black 1.524* .612 
Constant 12.115 .054 
Nagelkerke R .366 .371 
Square 
Note: One astensk denotes sIgruficance at the .05 level, two asterIsks at the .001 level 
An Exp (B) that exceeds one denotes a positive relationship, while less than one denotes a negative 
relationship. 
On the third set of issues, which can be seen on Tables 5 and 6, parenting style showed 
mixed results, and in general the impact of parenting on policy preference was weaker than for 
hypotheses 2a and 2b. Still, it remained a statistically significant predictor for some 
independent/interdependent issues. For the variable classified "equality," respondents were asked 
whed1er the country would be better off if we worried less about how equal people are. As predicted 
by Lakoffs model, nurturant parents turned out to be more concerned about fairness. This 
relationship proved to be statistically significant at the .001 level, and only party ID and ideology 
proved to be stronger predictors. Nurturant parents were also significandy more likely than strict 
fathers to support the Affordable Care Act, affirmative action, and welfare spending, findings 
consistent with Lakoffs predictions. While most of Hypothesis 2c's dependent variables had lower 
T-scores than security and traditional social issues, many remained statistically significant at the .001 
level, so while the relationship is perhaps weaker than Lakoff predicted it is certainly present. 
However, parenting theory fails to explain attitudes on government involvement in the 
economy and views on the proper size of government.2lG Lakoff would have predicted nurturant 
parents to advocate more government involvement to help solve society's inequalities, while strict 
fathers are supposed to distrust government and want it to do less. However, Table 6 shows that 
216 These two issues required binary logistic regression because respondents were only offered two choices. 
They were entered into a different table for this reason, and their Wald scores should not be compared to T­
scores in OLS. It was a mere coincidence that the two measures that did not support Lakoffs hypothesis were 
the two that required binary logistic regression. 
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while conservatives, Republicans, and men were more likely to endorse laissez-faire government, 
parenting had no significant effect. For size of government, there is a significant parenting effect, but 
it goes in the opposite way Lakoff's theory predicted it would. Strict parents were actually more likely 
to agree that there are more things that government should be doing. With only four out of six 
attitudes significantly predicted by parenting and one attitude directly contradicting his theory, it is 
difficult to say that Hypothesis 2c lends much support to Lakoff. 
CONCLUSION 
It appears that parenting might not be the single dominant political heuristic, as Lakoff 
predicted, but it certainly cannot be discounted. Few variables tested in political science have shown 
such a significant and consistent effect. The very fact that parenting's impact remains significant after 
controlling for party ID and ideology proves that Lakoff was on to something. The parenting index 
is off the charts for security and tradition, and even for many issues dealing with equality. However, it 
seems that parenting might be a poor predictor about people's views towards government. This is 
problematic, because Lakoff's central point was that the way people envision parent-child relations is 
the way they envision government-citizen relations. Parenting seems to be very important for 
politics-probably far more important than anyone suspected-but it is not always important in the 
exact ways Lakoff predicted. Nonetheless, he made a bold and original claim that largely passed the 
test of empirical scrutiny. 
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